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Abstract: We investigate the relationship between corporate social performance and institutional 
ownership. We distinguish between long-term and short-term institutional investors using 
holdings-based measures which directly capture the investment horizon of each institution. Our 
analysis shows that long term institutional investment is positively related to corporate social 
performance (mainly by an avoidance of investing in firms with significant controversies) whereas 
short-term institutional investment is negatively related to corporate social performance. Further 
investigation reveals that increased holdings of a firm by long-term investors are positively 
associated with its future corporate social performance. Hence, we provide evidence of a “virtuous 
circle” between long term investment and social responsibility. 
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Corporate social responsibility (CSR) is still on the rise. The notion has evolved from being an 
interesting yet peripheral issue that mostly business ethics academics and activists would push for 
to being a key business practice. Companies increasingly recognize the importance of effective 
CSR practices which help in building trusting, cooperative long-term relationship with crucial 
stakeholders (Jones, 1995). Hence , CSR has moved from the sphere of moral philosophy to a 
strategic management consideration (Clarkson, 1995).  
Credible business sources provide factual support to this evolution. According to a recent 
survey conducted by PwC and based on 1,409 (anonymised) interviews of CEOs across the world, 
85% recognise that their companies are expected to address wider stakeholder issues, 67% state 
that “our purpose is centred on creating value for wider stakeholders” and 64% claim that “Corporate 
responsibility is core to everything we do” (PwC, 2016). The numbers become even higher when CEOs 
are asked to answer to what extent these statements will be true five years after the interviews, 
which signifies the acknowledgement of the rising strategic significance of CSR for business. 
Inevitably, the accounting and financial aspects of CSR have followed similarly increasing trends. 
More than 7,800 companies published CSR or sustainability reports in 2015, an increase of 30% 
compared to 2010 (Institutional Investor, 2015). As for Socially Responsible Investing (SRI1 - i.e. 
the practice of incorporating environmental, social, governance and ethical considerations into the 
mainstream investment process), the growth has been nothing short of remarkable. According to 
a report of the US SIF foundation2, more than $8.7 trillion assets under management in the US 
alone fell under the umbrella of sustainable, responsible and impact investing in 2016. This 
                                                 
1 The acronym SRI is nowadays also used for Sustainable and Responsible Investing. Though subtle 
differences can be argued to exist between the two terms, the concept is largely the same. 
 
2 US SIF: The Forum for Sustainable and Responsible Investment is a United States-based membership 





compares to a little more than $2 trillion in 2005 (a percentage increase of more than 400% in 11 
years) and about $0.5 trillion in 1995 (an increase in excess of 1,700%). 
In an attempt to investigate whether increased levels of measurable Corporate Social 
Performance (CSP3) are aligned with improved firm profitability, market valuations and superior 
risk management (which would explain the above-mentioned trends in favour of CSR), a plethora 
of academic studies has focused on the links between CSP and various attributes of financial 
performance – paying particular attention on whether CSR is priced in the marketplace. The 
literature is now rich and diverse in the facets of CSR which are studied, the datasets and 
methodologies employed, the operationalizations of both CSR and financial performance, the 
periods of operation, sectors and domicile countries of the sample firms. This variability makes 
comparisons of results of different studies a challenging task and unanimous conclusions almost 
impossible to draw (Griffin and Mahon, 1997). Nevertheless, both vote-counting literature reviews 
(Margolis and Walsh 2003) and statistical meta-analyses (Orlitzky, Schmidt, and Rynes, 2003;  
Margolis, Elfenbein, and Walsh, 2009; Schröder, 2014; Friede, Busch, and Bassen, 2015) clearly 
point to modest, albeit positive, associations between CSR and increased financial performance 
(or reduced risk). Most recently, Friede, Busch and Bassen (2015) statistically combined the results 
of about 2,200 individual papers in the area and found that “Roughly 90% of studies find a nonnegative 
ESG–CFP4 relation. More importantly, the large majority of studies reports positive findings”.  
Yet, even though we now know a reasonable amount about the nature of the links between 
CSP and financial performance, we have uncovered very little about the characteristics of the 
                                                 
3 The term CSP is usually used to capture the outcome-based measurement of a firm’s stance towards CSR-
related issues. In this paper, we will use CSR as the acronym for the main concept and CSP for variables 
related to its measurement. 
 
4 ESG stands for Environmental, Social and Governance performance and is often used instead of CSR or 
CSP in recent literature. CFP stands for Corporate Financial Performance and it is a generic term used in 
the literature to encapsulate all the financial metrics that researchers have employed and tested whether 
they are correlated with CSP. 
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people and organizations which have made the choice of investing in CSR (and divesting or 
avoiding investments in firms with socially and environmentally controversial track-records). The 
number of studies which, directly or indirectly, investigate what  investors’ traits act as drivers, 
moderatos or mediators of the demand for CSR is very small (Bollen, 2007; Haigh, 2007; Bauer 
and Smeets, 2015 are notable exceptions) despite the academic and practical importance of this 
theme. In other words, we know very little about who, how and why one invests in Corporate 
Social Responsibility.  
In this paper, we aim to fill part of this knowledge gap within this admittedly wide-spreading 
field by focusing on the role that investment horizon plays on the demand for CSR by institutional 
investors. Institutional ownership of stocks has long been shown to influence both the pricing and 
volatility of these assets (Bushee and Noe, 2000; Gompers and Metrick, 2001). But more 
specifically, within the framework of SRI, institutional ownership has become increasingly 
important. This is clearly reflected both in the overall magnitude of the assets under professional 
management invested in SRI funds (the US SIF data previously mentioned is indicative of this) –
the demand for which comes primarily from institutional investors– and in the increasing number 
of signatories of the United Nations-backed Principles for Responsible Investment. This initiative 
has managed to secure the commitment of more than 1,600 asset owners, investment managers 
and financial service providers who pledge to “incorporate environmental, social and governance issues into 
their investment analysis and decision making processes”5.  
In focusing on institutional preferences for CSR, our aim is twofold. We first explore whether 
the widely used claim that the benefits of CSR tend to accrue in the long run is convincing for 
market participants, which would mean that stocks of firms with high (low) corporate social 
performance tend to be preferred by institutions which have longer (shorter) investment horizons 
                                                 





and keep their holdings unchanged for longer (shorter) periods.  Secondly, previous studies have 
shown that a higher proportion of long-term institutional ownership decreases managerial myopia 
and reduces pressures to corporate executives to meet short-term goals (Bushee, 1998). Hence, it 
would be reasonable to assume that firms with higher levels of long-term institutional owners have 
a greater capacity to utilise corporate resources in an effort to increases the firm’s CSP in the future 
– and manage to do so. We investigate if this is indeed the case. 
Our work contributes to the existing literature in three significant ways. Firstly, although studies 
on institutional investors often treat them as a homogenous group with similar objectives, 
investors’ differing investment horizons can affect their decisions. Thus, differentiating long-term 
from short-term ownership is essential for a better understanding of the important role that 
investment horizon plays on investment agendas of investors. Mixing ownership with different 
investment horizons together, Dyck et al. (2018) fail to detect that higher CSR is attractive to 
institutional investors. In contrast, we provide evidence in line with the frequently theorized but 
very rarely empirically tested hypothesis that the beneficial, value-creating or risk-reducing, 
financial effects of high CSP accrue in the long-term – and hence, firms with high CSP should be 
more attractive to more long-term investors.  
Secondly, investment horizon could also be an important factor in influencing investors’ 
corporate policy-making decisions involving CSR activities. Different institutional investors may 
have different attitudes toward CSR and mixing short-term and long-term investors may lead to 
inconsistent conclusions (see Harjoto and Hoje, 2011; and Borghesi et al., 2014). In this study, we 
separate investors with different expected holding periods and investigate the extent to which long-
term institutional ownership is associated with future improvements in the social, environmental 
and governance performance of their holding firms. Therefore, we also explore a parallel 
mechanism running in the opposite direction of the link between CSR and institutional ownership. 
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Thirdly, a crucial step in understanding the relationship between investment horizon and CSP 
is to accurately measure the former. In the finance literature, a direct holdings-based measure — 
churn rate — has been shown to accurately capture investment horizon and has been used widely 
in different strands of research (see, for example, Gaspar, Massa and Matos, 2015; Yan and Zhang, 
2009; Switzer and Wang, 2017).  To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study that makes 
use of the, arguably more accurate, churn rate as a direct measure of distinguishing between long-
term and short-term investors in CSR studies with US data. This improved investment horizon 
measure enables us to provide new empirical evidence about the IO-CSR relationship. In the 
extant literature, institutional investors  have been categorized into short-term versus long-term 
either based on their operational/legal identity (e.g. Cox, Brammer, and Millington, 2004) , or 
based on the classification defined in Bushee (2001) (see for example Boubaker et al., 2017). As 
we demonstrate in Section 3.3 of this study, both of these methods can lead to vastly different 
categorizations compared to the direct use of the churn rate and, we argue, to the introduction of 
more noise in the analysis. Therefore, we consider this methodological contribution to be modest 
but impactful. 
We show that long term institutional investment is positively related to corporate social 
performance whereas short-term institutional investment is negatively related to corporate social 
performance. Further investigation reveals that increased holdings of a firm by long-term investors 
are positively associated with future levels of corporate social performance. Hence, we provide 
evidence of a “virtuous circle” between long term investment and CSP, in line with the more 
generic findings of Waddock and Graves (1997) regarding the CSP-financial performance link. 
Our results are useful for understanding what type of investor is attracted to CSR as well as 
pinpointing investment horizon as one of the factors that leads to an institutional shift towards 
CSR at the firm level. Consequently, they are useful for firm managers, investment funds, 
regulators and the wider activist community advocating for increases in CSR.  
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The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides the details of the 
literature exploring the institutional demand for SRI and develops the framework of the 
hypotheses tested in the study. Section 3 describes the datasets we use and the methodology we 
employ. Section 4 reports and explains the empirical results of the study and Section 5 provides a 
concluding discussion. 
2. Related literature and development of hypotheses 
The role of institutional ownership has become much more prominent in the last decades. 
Aggregated data demonstrative of the shift in the overall ownership of stocks from retail investors 
to institutions are not available, but various estimates suggest that US retail investors owned 
approximately 90% of the stock market up until 1950 whereas the relevant percentage in recent 
years is in the vicinity of just 30-35% (Evans, 2009). The percentage of institutional ownership 
must have therefore correspondingly increased by a huge amount (55% to 60%) over the same 
period. The importance of this evolution becomes evident when one considers academic findings 
which suggest that institutional investors are less influenced by “attention grabbing” stocks (Barber 
and Odean, 2008), tend to be less myopic than individuals in terms of the strategies their holding 
firms are employing (Bushee, 1998), play an important role in determining executive compensation 
(Hartzell and Starks, 2003) and, ultimately, significantly influence equity prices (Gompers and 
Metrick, 2001; Boehmer and Kelley, 2009). 
In spite of all the aforementioned evidence, very few aspects of the relationship between 
institutional equity ownership and CSR have been studied. Graves and Waddock (1994) are among 
the first to look into this in the early era of responsible investment and cannot find evidence that 
CSR has a discernible impact on the percentage of firm shares held by institutions. But this 
conclusion may very well be a result of the heterogeneity in the characteristics of institutional 
investors. Different types of investing entities have different priorities, preferences, risk tolerances 
and investment horizons and hence they may have different attitudes towards CSR. Thus, when 
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including all institutional investors in one category, irrespective of their very different 
characteristics, no generalizable conclusions, can be drawn. Recognising this, subsequent studies 
on the same field looked at different types of institutional investors separately.   
Johnson and Greening (1999) find that pension fund holdings are positively associated with 
increased levels of diversity in the workplace and have better relationships with local communities 
and employees whereas none of these occur for the holdings of mutual funds and investment 
banks. Similarly, Cox, Brammer, and Millington (2004)  focus in the UK market and split 
institutional investors into a group comprising of pension funds, assurance funds and charitable 
funds and a group made up of unit trusts and investment trusts. They find that the majority of the 
investors in the former group (which they label as being long-term oriented investors) have 
holdings which are positively associated with CSP. These results are broadly verified by Cox and 
Wicks (2011) who use a categorisation of institutional investors as “dedicated” versus “transient”.  
Most recently, Harjoto, Jo, and Kim (2015) go a step further by investigating the functional 
form of the link between institutional ownership and CSP and the potentially mediating role of  
institutional investment in influencing the association of CSP and financial risk. They find a 
curvilinear (reverse U shape) relationship between the two, meaning that there is a perceived 
optimal level of CSP above which institutional investors may not wish to increase their ownership 
in a firm. But the main takeaway from their study is that “CSR decreases stock return volatility at a 
decreasing rate through its effect on institutional ownership” – a very interesting and novel observation.  
Although all of the above-mentioned papers recognize the importance of institutional 
ownership in the constantly evolving field of SRI, they do not attempt to explicitly test the impact 
that the investment horizon of institutional owners has on their preferences for CSP. Earlier 
empirical studies simply make no distinction between different types of institutional owners. In 
this study, we consider two types of institutional investors: long-term and short-term. By 
definition, long-term investors intend to hold their shares for a long-time period, whereas short-
10 
 
term investors trade at a higher frequency. Consequently, long-term investors care about the 
fundamental value of the stock while short-term investors only pay attention to short-term market 
price fluctuation, which may or may not correctly reflect the change of the firm’s fundamental 
value. The stock price may temporarily deviate from its fundamental value simply because it takes 
time for the market to incorporate new information (e.g. the change of the firm’s CSR score) into 
the stock price. It follows that an inefficient stock market drives a wedge between short-term and 
long-term investors. Unlike long-term investors, short-term investors do not appreciate CSR 
activities because it is (or believed to be) likely that the value of such activities will only be 
incorporated in the stock price in the long term.6 
Cox, Brammer, and Millington (2004) note the significance of making a distinction between 
short-term and long-term institutional investors but their categorization depends on the legal or 
operating nature of each institution instead of their actual investing and trading behaviours (i.e. 
how often and how much they tend to rebalance the assets in their portfolios). More recently, Cox 
and Wicks (2011) and Boubaker et al. (2017) rely on the classification (dedicated versus transient) 
defined in Bushee (2001) to distinguish between institutional investors with long versus short 
horizon (based on investors’ trading behaviour variables and portfolio characteristics), when 
examining the impact of investment horizon on CSR. Although the Bushee classification intends 
to capture the substantive differences in trading and governance behaviour within types of 
investors (e.g. pension funds, bank trusts and others) and represents a step forward in more 
accurately measuring investment horizon, it, unlike our measure, is more intricate and not entirely 
based on trading turnover.  In that sense, it is not a “pure” measure of investment horizon.7  As 
                                                 
6 However, if the stock market is efficient, the stock price at any time point equals its fundamental value. 
As a result, the interests of short-term investors and long-term investors are aligned perfectly, which are to 
maximize the present value of all future cash flows of the firm. Therefore, under the efficient market 
assumption, investment horizon does not really matter.  
7 The Bushee classification uses a factor and cluster analysis approach to classify institutional investors, 
based on a large number of trading behaviour variables and portfolio characteristics (e.g. portfolio turnover, 
diversification, and momentum trading). 
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we will show in Section 3.3, a considerable amount of long-term ownership (measured by actual 
holdings and trading data) is classified as short-term (transient) under the Bushee classification and 
vice versa. To the best of our knowledge, the study of Li and Lu (2015) is the only other paper in 
this area which employs a direct measurement of institutional investor horizon based on actual 
holdings. However, the setting of this study is based on evidence from Chinese firms where a very 
large proportion of institutional ownership comes from the state and in fact the authors verify that 
environmental performance seems to only be positively related to institutional ownership for state 
owned enterprises. Our analysis also explicitly uses a direct measurement of institutional equity 
holdings and trading turnover to distinguish between short-term and long-term investors. 
However, it is based on US data where government/state ownership of publicly traded firms is 
much less important and hence institutional investment patterns are arguably more reflective of 
the true preferences for CSP in the marketplace.   
Our ex ante hypotheses are that higher CSP will be positively associated to long-term 
institutional holdings and negatively associated to short-term institutional holdings.  A significant 
body of conceptual academic work in strategic management has provided a framework that 
supports our assertions. Looking at corporate social responsibility from the perspective of the 
resource-based view of the firm, the work of  Barney (1991) and Barney and Hansen (1994) 
suggests that corporate efforts to improve social  welfare can create valuable reputational capital 
for the firm and add to its relational wealth with suppliers, employees, clients and other 
stakeholders. These efforts to increase CSP constitute complex social resources that are rare and 
hard to replicate, hence can lead to long–term, sustainable advantages. Barney and Hansen (1994) 
note that the networks of relations created via this avenue “are developed over long periods of time”  
p.184) so it would be sensible to assume that the relative impacts in the value of the firm also 
accrue in the long-run. Consequently, we would expect institutional investors with long term 
horizons to have a higher preference for higher CSP firms. 
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Jones (1995) looks at firms as a nexus of contracts and provides an extensive conceptual 
framework which suggests that opportunism and self-interest can prevent firms from developing 
and maintaining long-term, mutually beneficial relationships with their stakeholders, thus leading 
to higher monitoring costs, inefficient contracting and, ultimately, a competitive disadvantage. 
Combining this work with Godfrey's (2005) arguments that CSR provides evidence of “good 
corporate character” in favour of the firm and helps in building the aforementioned long-term 
relationship further reinforces the point that the value of CSP is more relevant to long-run 
measurements of firm performance. Along very similar lines, Waddock and Graves (1997) note 
that “such resource allocations may be strategically linked to improvements in long-term image and relationships 
with the communities with which it (the firm) must interact”. All of these arguments and positions are 
strongly reiterated in the work of Hillman and Keim (2001). The authors argue that at least some 
strategic aspects of high CSP can be value creating in the long-run as the firm builds strong links 
with its primary stakeholders: “Relations with primary stakeholders…customers, employees, suppliers, 
community residents and the environment—can constitute intangible, socially complex resources that may enhance 
firms’ ability to outperform competitors in terms of long-term value creation.”  
Given all the above, we expect that higher CSP will be a desirable characteristic for institutional 
investors who anticipate their investments to reap benefits in the long-run and as such tend to 
hold on to their equity for longer periods (i.e. have a lower trading turnover). We also expect the 
opposite to be true for institutional stock owners with short-run investment horizons: 
 Hypothesis 1: High (low) CSP is associated with longer (shorter) investment horizons and lower (higher) stock 
turnover.  
The academic literature on the financial effects of CSP has often made the case that there is some 
variability in their magnitude according to the nature of social, governance and environmental 
actions (or inactions) on the part of the firm. More specifically, there are multiple studies which 
argue that a firm going “the extra mile” in terms of CSP and being proactively engaged in various 
13 
 
socially beneficial initiatives is not necessarily significantly rewarded through the marketplace. On 
the other hand, firms associated with social/environmental controversies are highly likely to, 
literally and figuratively, pay the price of their irresponsibility. For example, Meijer and Schuyt 
(2005) show that consumers are willing to boycott a firm if its CSP is particularly low but, on the 
other hand, high levels of CSP do not bring about measurable increases in product sales. More 
broadly, Lankoski (2009) reiterates the existence of a negativity bias (the phenomenon according 
to which negative actions are perceived as more impactful and are weighed more heavily than 
positive actions) in the CSP-firm performance link. She argues and shows that “the economic impacts 
of corporate responsibility are more positive for issues reducing negative externalities than for issues generating positive 
externalities” (p. 218). More recently, Kappou and Oikonomou (2016) investigate the “social index 
effect” and find that although deletions of stocks from a socially responsible index (caused by 
various social, environmental or ethical controversies) are associated with statistically significant 
negative abnormal returns, additions to the index do not manifest in any measurable financial 
result. Motivated by the above findings we further posit: 
Hypothesis 2: The positive association of high CSP and longer investment horizons is predominantly driven by an 
avoidance or underweighting of firms with significant social/environmental controversies rather than an overweighting 
of firms with significant respective strengths. 
The implications of our study are not restricted to the arena of capital markets but instead can 
spread into the field on corporate decision making on the part of managers and influence the way 
business is conducted. Due to this, we find it useful to investigate whether the relationship between 
institutional ownership and CSP also runs from the former to the latter. The often cited “myopic 
institutions theory” (Hansen and Hill, 1991; Graves and Waddock, 1994) argues that higher 
institutional investment invariably creates pressures to meet short-term earnings and stock price 
goals. This, in turn, leads to reductions in innovative practices which require immediate 
investments but have long-term cash flow effects – such as R&D or practices increasing CSP. 
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Bushee (1998) provides some support to this theory by empirically demonstrating that it is true 
only for institutions that have a higher portfolio turnover and engage in momentum trading, i.e. 
they could be de facto characterised as short-term investors. Otherwise, institutional ownership is 
actually positively associated to corporate projects yielding long-term benefits. Based on the above 
we posit: 
Hypothesis 3: Long-term institutional ownership is positively related to subsequent increases in the CSP of the 
owned firms. 
To our knowledge, the only previous study to have looked at a relationship running from 
institutional ownership to CSP is that of  Dam and Scholtens (2012). The authors use data from 
one year (2005) and 16 different countries and provide mixed evidence regarding the sign of this 
relationship. Perhaps one reason for this is that there is no distinction made between long-term 
and short-term investors. Our study addresses this issue. In the following section we present the 
datasets, variables, and methodologies we use in order to test our hypotheses. 
3. Data and Methodology 
3.1. Data and sample construction 
Our sample is constructed with a variety of data sources. We start with a sample of firms covered 
by the Kinder, Lydenberg, and Domin (KLD) STATS database (now owned by MSCI) from 1991 
to 2012. KLD contains detailed information on US firms’ CSR activities and is arguably the most 
comprehensive and certainly the most widely-used source of data for research in CSR. The 
database uses sources both internal to the firm (e.g. annual reports) and external (e.g. articles in 
the business press) to conduct yearly assessments of the social performance of the 3,000 largest 
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US publicly traded companies by market capitalization.8 We then merge the KLD data with the 
institutional ownership data obtained from Thomson Reuter’s 13F database, which contains 
quarterly institutional holdings for all common stocks traded on NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ.9 
We delete observations with overall institutional ownership over 100%, which reduces the number 
of observations by less than 1%.10 We obtain data on firms’ characteristics from the Compustat 
database, and data on stock price, stock return, trading volume, and firm age from the Centre for 
Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database. The final sample consists of 22,801 firm-year 
observations, representing 3,714 US firms over the 1991-2012 period. 
3.2. Measuring CSP  
We employ the KLD database to construct our CSP measures. KLD assesses firms with regard to 
their strengths and concerns on a variety of dimensions of CSR. More specifically, companies are 
rated on multiple categories, including seven “qualitative issue areas” (these being community, 
diversity, employee relationship, environment, product, human rights and corporate governance) 
as well as six “controversial business issues” (which examine the extent to which a firm is involved 
with military contracting, nuclear power, firearms, alcohol, tobacco, or gambling). The qualitative 
                                                 
8 Starting with the S&P 500 Index firms and the Domini 400 Social Index firms in 1991, KLD has expanded 
its coverage to incorporate the largest 1,000 US companies by market value since 2001, an expansion which 
advanced further in 2003 with the inclusion of the 3,000 largest US firms. 
 
9 The Security and Exchange Commission (SEC) requires that all institutions operating in the US with 
discretion over 13F securities worth $100 million or more report all equity holdings greater than 10,000 
shares (or $200,000) to the SEC at a quarterly frequency. 
 
10 There are several reasons which could lead to a nominal institutional ownership rate being higher than 
100% for a given firm. First of all, when investors share investment discretion, the security may be double 
counted (once for each institution). Secondly, when investors short sell a security, it will be recorded as a 
holding for both the lender and the borrower (short-seller) which will also lead to an overstatement of 
ownership. Thirdly, sometimes a firm’s financial reporting date and institutional investors reporting date 
will not match perfectly. In this case, if a firm’s total shares outstanding changed dramatically during this 
time gap, the base of ownership calculation could cause some data errors (Striewe, Rottke, and Zietz 2013). 
To minimize the effects of these factors, we follow the same treatment as in Yan and Zhang (2009). Our 





dimension indicators include both strengths and concerns of the same category, whereas the 
controversial business issues by definition are only rated on concerns. All ratings are binary, with 
1 representing the presence of a particular strength/concern and 0 representing its absence. 
Following much of the literature, including Hillman and Keim (2001) and Oikonomou, Brooks 
and Pavelin (2012), we do not consider the controversial business issues and concentrate on the 
five main CSP qualitative issue areas: community, diversity, employee relationship, environment, 
and product.11 The fact that the number of strengths and concerns within each CSP category has 
evolved over time as KLD refined the database makes it difficult to directly compare strengths 
(concerns) across years. Therefore, we scale the strengths and concerns of each category to obtain 
two indices that range from 0 to 1. To be more specific, within a particular qualitative dimension 
for each firm-year we calculate adjusted dimension-level strength (concern) scores by adding all 
the ratings of the indicators for the strengths (concerns) and then dividing the sum by the 
maximum possible number of strengths (concerns). Then we compute dimension-level CSP scores 
as the net difference between adjusted dimension-level strength and concern scores for all five 
qualitative dimensions studied in the paper. The five dimension-level CSP scores are denoted as 
Community score (COM_CSP), Diversity score (DIV_CSP), Employee score (EMP_CSP), 
Environment score (ENV_CSP), and Product score (PRO_CSP). Finally, we construct three 
aggregate CSP measures: overall strengths (AGG_S), overall concerns (AGG_C) and overall CSP 
(AGG_CSP). To calculate AGG_S (AGG_C), we simply sum the adjusted dimension-level 
strengths (concerns) across the five categories and then divide the sum by five.12 To calculate 
AGG_CSP, we subtract the AGG_C from the AGG_S. 
                                                 
11 Following Servaes and Tamayo (2013), we exclude corporate governance from our CSP construction 
because it is a mechanism that aligns the interest between shareholders and managers rather than a concern 
that deals with social objectives and stakeholders other than shareholders. Human rights has also historically 
considered to be too broad of a category within KLD and not related to a particular group of stakeholders 
so is also excluded from the analysis. 
12 Following Hillman and Keim (2001) and Oikonomou, Brooks, and Pavelin (2012), we assume that each 




3.3. Measuring Institutional Ownership 
We construct three institutional ownership measures. For a particular firm, we first measure its 
total institutional ownership (hereafter 𝑇𝐼𝑂) as the ratio between the number of shares held by 
institutional investors and the total number of shares outstanding. We then further classify 
institutional investors into short-term and long-term investors based on their portfolio turnover 
during the past four quarters. Short-term investors, by definition, buy and sell their investments 
frequently, which is reflected in high portfolio turnover. In contrast, long-term investors tend to 
hold their positions unchanged for a relatively long time period and thus are associated with low 
portfolio turnover. Therefore, portfolio turnover de facto serves as an intuitive criterion to 
distinguish long term investors from their short-term peers. Following Gaspar, Massa and Matos 
(2005), for each institutional investor 𝑖 at time 𝑡 we calculate churn rate (𝐶𝑅𝑖,𝑡), a measure of how 
frequently the investor rotates her positions on all the stocks of her portfolio. More precisely, in 
quarter 𝑡, investor 𝑖’s churn rate is: 
𝐶𝑅𝑖,𝑡 =




                                                                   (1) 
where 𝑄 represents the set of companies held by investor 𝑖.  𝑃𝑗,𝑡 and 𝑁𝑗,𝑖,𝑡 are the price and the 
number of shares, respectively, of company 𝑗  held by institutional investor 𝑖  at time 𝑡 . ∆𝑃𝑗,𝑡 
represents the price change of share 𝑗 between time 𝑡 − 1 and 𝑡. At time 𝑡, if 𝑁𝑗,𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑁𝑗,𝑖,𝑡−1 for 
all 𝑗, it means that investor 𝑖 does not change her portfolio at all during the period and thus her 
                                                 
as important as product safety and quality. Though not a perfect solution, in the absence of up to date data 
on the relative importance of each dimension this is what the literature has been employing. 
18 
 
churn ratio is equal to zero as the numerator of Equation (1) becomes zero, suggesting that she is 
a long-term investor. 






                                                                                                                       (2) 
Based on the average churn rate, at each year end we sort all investors into three tertiles. Those 
ranked in the top tertile with the highest 𝐴𝑉𝐺_𝐶𝑅𝑖,𝑡  (top 33.3%) are classified as short-term 
institutional investors and those ranked in the bottom tertile are categorised as long-term investors. 
Finally, short-term (long-term) institutional ownership (hereafter 𝑆𝐼𝑂 and 𝐿𝐼𝑂) is constructed as 
the ratio between the number of shares held by short-term (long-term) investors and the total 
number of shares outstanding. Appendix 1 summarizes definitions and data sources of various 
CSP and institutional ownership measures.  
------------------------------------------------------------------ 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
------------------------------------------------------------------- 
We have a total of 4,588 unique institutional investors with holdings in at least one firm in one 
year of our sample. It is worth noting that the average churn rate for short-term investors across 
all years is 15% whereas for long-term investors it is just 2.2%. This essentially translates to short-
term investors rebalancing their holding at a pace of nearly 7 times faster than their long-term 
peers – a truly sizable differential. In addition, an important observation that should be highlighted 
is that our classification of long-term (short-term) investors leads to substantially different 
proportions of long-term (short-term) ownership, compared with the methods used by the 
traditional classifications (fiduciary duty-based classification and Bushee classification). For 
example, Pension Funds are thought of as being typical examples of long-term institutional 
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owners. Yet Table 1 shows that less than half (48.53%) of corporate pension funds are actually 
classified as long-term investors based on their churn rate, whereas a very significant proportion 
of them (25.23%) are actually short-term investors. The misclassification is even more dramatic 
when looking at insurance companies. Only about one third of them (33.89%) appear to be true 
long-term investors based on their trading turnover while nearly half (48.52%) are actually short-
term investors. The Bushee classification can also lead to mischaracterisations as demonstrated in 
Panel B of Table 1. Only 30.93% of the Dedicated Investors and 43.34% of Quasi Indexers under 
the Bushee classification are long-term investors in the purest sense (i.e. according to turnover of 
holdings). As such, we argue that any previous work in the area that makes use of this classification 
method, possibly introduces a significant amount of noise in its subsequent empirical analysis – 
which may also mean drawing misleading conclusions. For example, Boubaker et al. (2017) use the 
Bushee classification and label both Dedicated Investors and Quasi Indexers as long-term 
investors. As we have shown, in our sample the application of the same logic would have led to a 
vastly different (and, we would argue, noisier) classification of investors compared to the use of 
the churn rate. 
3.4. Methodology 
With the comprehensive firm-level data retrieved from multiple sources, we are interested in three 
main questions regarding the relationship between investment horizon and CSP. First, does 
heterogeneity in terms of investment horizon among institutional investors play a significant role 
in determining their preferences for CSP? Second, if long-term investors do prefer firms with a 
higher CSP score as the theory would suggest, do they have equal appetite for seeking strengths 
and for avoiding concerns? Lastly, if the benefit of activities improving CSP indeed accrues in the 
long run as literature claims, is there empirical evidence that long-term investors promote higher 
CSP once they become shareholders? 
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To examine the first question, we conduct regression analyses by employing three different 
institutional ownership (𝐼𝑂) measures as dependent variables. More specifically, our empirical 
framework is based on the estimation of the following prediction model: 
𝐼𝑂𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1AGG_CSP𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛄𝐗𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                                                                 (3) 
 
In Equation (3), the subscripts 𝑖 and 𝑡 denotes the firm and the time (year), respectively. 𝐼𝑂 is 
either 𝑇𝐼𝑂, 𝑆𝐼𝑂, or 𝐿𝐼𝑂 corresponding to total institutional ownership, short-term and long- term 
institutional ownership respectively13. Our variable of interest is AGG_CSP, our measure of overall 
CSP constructed using KLD data. The sign and significance of the coefficient 𝛽1 reveals the 
relationship between CSP and a particular 𝐼𝑂 measure. 𝐗 is a vector of control variables and  𝛄 is 
a coefficient vector. The first control variable we include in 𝐗 is the lagged dependent variable 
(𝐼𝑂𝑖,𝑡−1).  Allowing for dynamics in 𝐼𝑂 is crucial for recovering consistent estimates of 𝛽1 if 𝐼𝑂 is 
serially correlated.14  Prior research shows that certain firm characteristics are associated with 
institutional investors’ investment preference and thus should be controlled to mitigate the 
problem of possible spurious relationship between 𝐼𝑂 and CSP (see Gompers and Metrick, 2001; 
Yan and Zhang, 2009; Harjoto, Jo, and Kim, 2015). Specifically, institutional investors are 
documented to take into account prudence, stock liquidity, transactions costs, and expected future 
returns when they make their investment decisions. Therefore, following Yan and Zhang (2009) 
we include three groups of control variables in 𝐗: 1) Size (MV), firm age (AGE), dividend yield 
(DY), S&P 500 index membership (S&PIDX), leverage (DTA), stock risk (both systematic risk 
(BETA) and idiosyncratic risk (IRISK)) to control for prudence; 2) Share price (PRC) and stock 
                                                 
13 Analytical descriptions of all the key dependent and independent variables have been placed in Appendix 
1 for the sake of parsimony.  
14 Including the lagged dependent variable could result in biased coefficient estimates if the true data generating 
process is static. To alleviate this concern, we remove the lagged dependent variable and re-estimate all regression 
specifications. Our (unreported) results are robust to the changes. We thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing 
this out to us. 
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turnover (TOV) to control for liquidity and transactions costs; and 3) Past returns (RET), earnings 
per share (EPS), and book-to-market ratio (BM) to control for expected future returns (see Fama 
and French, 1992). To account for industry specific factors that may affect the relationship 
between 𝐼𝑂 and CSP, we include industry dummy variables, which are constructed based on the 
two-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code. We also add year dummies in 𝐗 to account 
for changing economic conditions and more importantly the observed evolution of CSP-related 
recognitions and practices. Appendix 2 summarizes definitions and data sources for these control 
variables. 
Equation (3) looks at the overall CSP indicator, which summarizes strengths and concerns into 
one single figure and consequently prevents us from exploring investors’ potentially different 
attitudes towards firms’ socially beneficial and controversial activities. Thus, we replace the 
AGG_CSP variable with two variables AGG_S and AGG_C, representing social strengths and 
concerns respectively: 
𝐼𝑂𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1AGG_S𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2AGG_C𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛄𝐗𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                                         (4) 
In Equation (4), we are interested in variables AGG_S and AGG_C, which enable us to breakdown 
overall CSP and allow for asymmetric effects of strengths and concerns on future institutional 
ownership.  
Literature has established a positive relationship between CSP and firm financial performance. 
In particular, the benefits of responsible performance have been argued to accrue in the long term, 
and as such could be enjoyed mainly by long-term investors. This rationale provides incentives to 
these investors to promote CSR practices once they become shareholders so that they reap the 
respective financial rewards in the long run. To empirically test this hypothesis, we estimate the 
following reduced-form model: 
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CSP𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1LIO𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛄𝐘𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                                                               (5) 
In Equation (5), the subscripts 𝑖 and 𝑡 denote firm and the time (year), respectively. 𝐶𝑆𝑃 is either 
𝐴𝐺𝐺_𝐶𝑆𝑃, 𝐴𝐺𝐺_𝑆, or 𝐴𝐺𝐺_𝐶, representing overall CSP, overall strengths and overall concerns, 
respectively. Our variable of interest is 𝐿𝐼𝑂. It is calculated as yearend shareholdings of long-term 
institutional investors relative to total shares outstanding for a given firm on a given year.  𝑌 is a 
vector of control variables and  𝛄 is a coefficient vector. Following the literature, we include in 𝑌, 
firm size (MV), book-to-market ratio (BM), leverage (DTA), and return on asset (ROA) as control 
variables.15 We expect larger firms and more profitable firms to have more slack resources that can 
be allocated to CSR projects. In contrast, leverage is expected to have a negative effect on overall 
CSP because as leverage increases, firms pay more interest and have fewer resources available for 
CSR activities. If a firm’s CSR policies reflect its culture, it is reasonable to assume that its CSP is 
autocorrelated and as a result the inclusion of lagged dependent variable (𝐴𝐺𝐺_𝐶𝑆𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1) in 𝑌 is 
warranted. We also include 𝑁𝑜𝑛 − 𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑔 − 𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚 𝐼𝑂 (NLIO) to capture the impact of other 
institutional ownership (including short-term and medium-term ownership) on future CSP.  In 
addition, we control for industry fixed effects and year fixed effects as in equations (3) and (4). 
Appendix 2 summarizes definitions and data sources for these control variables. 
4. Empirical results 
4.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics of key variables. Panel A contains the information on CSP 
indicators. The overall CSP score (AGG_CSP) is negative on average, indicating a relatively higher 
average concern score than strength score. Indeed, this is confirmed by the lower average of 
AGG_S compared to AGG_C (0.05 versus 0.08). Looking at the five CSP dimensions separately, 
                                                 
15 See Waddock and Graves (1997), Neubaum and Zahra (2006), and Cao, Liang, and Zhan (2016). 
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five have negative (or zero) scores, ranging between -0.07 and 0. Community (COM_CSP), in 
contrast, has a positive average score of 0.02. Consistent with the findings in Bouslah, Kryzanowski 
and M’Zali (2013), the absolute mean values of all six dimensions are close to zero, revealing that 
the typical firm-year observation in our sample has largely equal number of strengths and concerns. 
Panel B of Table 2 contains institutional ownership measures and it shows that the average total 
institutional ownership for firms in the sample is 65%, out of which 17% is short-term and 20% 
is long-term, according to our churn-rate based classification. Panel C of the same table reports 
descriptive statistics for our control variables. Over our sample period, the average firm BETA is 
1.066, which is almost the same as the beta of the market portfolio, indicating that our sample is 
comprehensive and representative. The typical firm in our sample has average leverage (DTA) of 
0.254 and average book-to-market ratio (BM) of 0.561. 26.1% of our sample firms are included in 
the S&P 500 Index and the average firm age is about 22 years. In panel D, we report the mean 
values of our three aggregate CSP measures across tertiles of 𝐿𝐼𝑂  and 𝑆𝐼𝑂 , respectively. 
Consistent with our prediction, both average AGG_SMC and average AGG_S increase as 𝐿𝐼𝑂 
increases but decrease as 𝑆𝐼𝑂 increases (from the bottom tertile to the top tertile). It is interesting 
that AGG_C increases with 𝐿𝐼𝑂,  which is counterintuitive and warrants a formal regression 
analysis, controlling for other relevant factors. The different (actually opposite) patterns of the 
relation between CSP measures and the two types of institutional ownership (long-term and short-
term) signal the importance of examining long-term and short-term investors separately. 
------------------------------------------------------------------ 
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Table 3 presents the pairwise correlations among all variables used in the paper. Almost all of 
the correlation coefficients among control variables are quite low (less than 35%), suggesting that 
multicollinearity should not affect our analysis. The exception to this, expectedly so, comes from 
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the high correlations between market value, log of stock price and index membership. Iteratively 
dropping each of these variables from our model specifications does not change our results. 
------------------------------------------------------------------ 
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
------------------------------------------------------------------- 
4.2 Main results 
This section presents our main empirical results. We first investigate the impact of a firm’s overall 
CSP score on its future institutional ownership. We next zoom in on specific aspects of firms’ CSR 
activities.  More precisely, to further understand the mechanism through which CSP is associated 
with institutional ownership, we look at overall strengths, overall concerns, and dimension-level 
CSR scores (e.g. COM_CSP, DIV_CSP, EMP_CSP, ENV_CSP, and PRO_CSP), respectively. 
Lastly, we examine whether and how (e.g. through enhancing strengths or reducing concerns) 
long-term investors, as shareholders, promote future CSR activities. 
A. How do CSR activities affect institutional ownership? 
Table 4 contains the results, focusing on overall CSP. The insignificant coefficient of the main 
CSP variable (AGG_CSP) in column 1 implies that institutional investors as a whole might not 
factor in CSP when they make investment decisions. However, this finding might just as well be 
the result of the opposite attitudes toward CSR of long-term and short-term investors, as we 
explained in Section 2. Specifically, it is possible that mixing the two types of investors under the 
same umbrella buries the true effects of CSP and leads to the insignificant outcome. To disentangle 
the possibly differing attitudes towards CSR for long-term and short-term investors, we replace 
the independent variable TIO in specification 1 (representing total institutional ownership) with 
SIO and LIO in specifications 2 and 3 (representing long-term and short-term institutional 
ownership respectively). The negative and significant coefficient of AGG_CSP in column 2 
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indicates that short-term investors do consider CSR in their decision-making models and they tend 
to avoid firms with higher CSP. On the other hand, column 3 shows that long-term investors are 
attracted by CSR and prefer to invest in socially friendly firms. These findings are consistent with 
our prediction and more importantly, highlight the usefulness of recognizing the significant role 
investment horizon plays in determining CSR effects on institutional ownership.  
------------------------------------------------------------------ 
INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
------------------------------------------------------------------- 
The negative bias in the CSP-firm performance link established in the literature and discussed 
in Section 2 of this paper suggests asymmetric effects of strengths and concerns on future 
institutional ownership. To empirically test the theory, we replace overall CSP with strengths 
(AGG_S) and concerns (AGG_C) and re-estimate our model. Indeed, results in Table 5 show that 
firms’ positive and negative social actions affect investors’ preference differently. The negative 
coefficients of AGG_S and AGG_C in column 1 imply that institutional investors as a whole (i.e. 
when not categorising them according to their investment horizon) dislike both strengths and 
concerns, which is in stark contrast with the finding in column 1 of Table 4 that institutional 
investors have an indifferent attitude toward CSR. The two contradicting results are consistent 
with Godfrey et al. (2010)’s argument that the process of netting a firm’s social strengths and 
concerns “obscures more than it reveals”. More importantly, when taking into consideration 
investor horizon, the results in columns 2 and 3 suggest that long-term investors’ preference for 
firms with higher CSP as displayed in Table 4 is mainly driven by an avoidance of firms with higher 
social controversies, whereas the negative relationship between CSP and short-term ownership is 






INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE 
------------------------------------------------------------------- 
The overall CSP of a firm is the combination of its performance in several dimensions, 
including community, diversity, employee relationship, environment, and product. The 
aggregation of the five dimensions of CSR activities into a single measure AGG_CSP facilitates 
our analysis, which reveals the general relationship between CSR and institutional ownership. 
However, individual dimensions may offer additional informative content and enable us to 
investigate the difference between and relative importance of those dimensions in terms of their 
influence on firm performance and thus future institutional ownership. Table 6 shows that the 
impacts of the five dimensions are heterogeneous. Results in columns 6 through 10 indicate that, 
among the five dimensions, only firms with better employee relationship and higher product 
quality from a social perspective attract long-term investors. Short-term investors, on the other 
hand, seem to only pay attention to the environment and product dimensions of CSR activities, as 
the negative and significant coefficients of ENV_CSP and PRO_CSP in columns 4 and 5 suggest.  
It is worth noting that the product dimension is the only common dimension that both long-term 
and short-term investors consider when they select their investment. 
------------------------------------------------------------------ 
INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE 
------------------------------------------------------------------- 
B. Do long-term institutional investors promote CSR and if so, how? 
Rational long-term institutional investors would promote CSR of their invested firms if, as the 
literature argues, positive corporate social activities yield long-run financial benefits. Investors 
increasingly use engagement strategies to ensure that their portfolios incorporate CSR issues. For 
example, in their 2017 annual report, PGGM, the second largest pension fund in the Netherlands, 
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states: “As an active shareholder, we vote at shareholders’ meetings around the world. In 2017, we 
voted at 3,524 shareholder meetings. In addition, we attempt to realise ESG improvements by 
engaging in dialogue with companies and market parties. In 2017 we engaged in dialogue with 361 
companies and 8 market parties. We achieved a total of 50 engagement results.” The three concrete 
examples of the engagement mentioned in the same report are all about reducing CSR 
controversies.16 Furthermore, studying 682 engagements across 296 firms worldwide, Hoepner et 
al. (2018) conclude that “the goal of most of these engagements is to engender higher standards 
of corporate ESG practices that serve as an insurance mechanism against harmful, risk-inducing 
events”. Therefore, we expect that long-term institutional investors are likely to improve CSR 
mainly through reducing CSR controversies. Table 7 reports the results of estimating Equation (5). 
More precisely, the dependent variable in specification 1 is overall CSP (AGG_CSP) one year after 
the investor bought shares of the firm and the dependent variable in specification 2 is AGG_CSP 
five years after the purchase. As shown in column 1 of Table 7, 𝐿𝐼𝑂 enters into the regression 
with a positive and significant coefficient, confirming the intuition that long-term investors 
promote overall CSP. Interestingly, comparing the results in columns 1 and 2, the positive 
association between 𝐿𝐼𝑂 and overall CSP is enhanced economically as we increase horizon from 
one year to five years. This finding may suggest that it takes time for institutional ownership to 
materially impact the culture of a firm and lead to higher levels of CSP.  
We look at the asymmetry between strengths and concerns by regressing overall strengths and 
concerns, separately, on 𝐿𝐼𝑂 and control variables. Columns 3 through 6 in Table 7 contain the 
results. We employ AGG_S (AGG_C) one year after the investor’s purchase of the firm’s shares 
as the dependent variable in column 3 (5), and AGG_S (AGG_C) for the respective five-year point 
                                                 
16 The three examples are: 1). In 2017, PGGM engaged in dialogue with Tyson to improve its wastewater 
management; 2). PGGM engaged in dialogue with various companies in the mining, oil and gas sectors, 
including Glencore and FreePort McmoRan, to improve their assessment of potential human rights 




as the dependent variable in column 4 (6). Overall, it appears that as shareholders, long-term 
investors not only increase positive social activities but also decrease social controversies. 
Interestingly, our analysis further discovers certain asymmetry between the two types of activities. 
Specifically, the insignificant coefficient of 𝐿𝐼𝑂  in column 5 combined with the significant 
coefficient in column 6 indicate that long-term investors promote social strengths rather slowly. 
In contrast, results in column 3 suggest that long-term investors almost immediately reduce 
controversies after becoming shareholders. This may have to do either with the asymmetric 
financial effects of concerns versus strengths as we previously noted (greater for the former) or it 
may be that it simply takes more time, know-how and overall resources for a firm to proactively 
do good than to reduce its socially/environmentally harmful activities.17 
------------------------------------------------------------------ 
INSERT TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE 
------------------------------------------------------------------- 
In Section 4.2.A, we show that long-term investors intend to invest in firms with high CSR 
performance. Then, if firms already investing in CSR (e.g. have already established a stable CSR 
policy) are more likely to keep investing, the positive relationship between LIO and CSP shown in 
Table 7 might simply be the result of the persistence of CSR performance. To address this concern, 
we divide our sample firms into two groups according to a firm’s CSP as follows: one that consists 
of high CSP firms—firms with a CSP that is higher than the industry average, and the other 
consists of low CSP firms—firms with a CSP that is lower than the industry average. We then 
investigate the impact of long-term IO on CSP with the two sub-samples, respectively. As shown 
in Appendix 3 Table A3.2, we find significant long-term IO effects for both subsamples and the 
                                                 
17 To corroborate our results and further show that increase in LIO leads to increase in CSR performance, 
we conduct regression analysis looking at the change of long-term IO and the change of CSR scores. The 
change regression results show that indeed long-term institutional investors increase CSR performance and 
they do so by immediately reducing controversies (see Appendix 3 Table A3.1). 
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effect in some cases is even stronger for the low CSP group (see columns 4 and 12). This indicates 
that the long-term IO effect on CSP shown in Table 7 is not likely to be solely due to the 
persistence of CSR performance and thus alleviates the relevant concern.  
Having shown that long-term investors promote overall CSP, we now have a closer look at the 
various components of CSR. Table 8 contains the results, which are qualitatively similar and 
consistent with the results obtained with overall CSP, confirming a positive relationship between 
LIO and CSP. Specifically, we find that long-term institutional investors promote almost all 
dimensions of CSP. Our results are in stark contrast to those in Borghesi et al. (2014), which are 
derived using overall IO. This once again highlights the important role that investment horizon 
plays in the IO-CSP relationship.18 
------------------------------------------------------------------ 
INSERT TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE 
------------------------------------------------------------------- 
4.3 Accounting for endogeneity 
A common criticism in studies investigating market reactions to CSP is the potential 
endogeneity between the CSP proxies and financial metrics of interest. Our use of lagged 
independent variables in our baseline regressions allows us to alleviate this issue as we do not 
explore a contemporaneous link between institutional ownership and corporate social 
performance. Instead, we posit, investigate and find a bidirectional, lead-lag relationship between 
the two, where CSP and institutional ownership influence each other, albeit with some time needed 
for this feedback process to occur. This seems intuitive enough as we would not expect immediate 
changes of institutional ownership due to changes in CSP as this would entail significant 
                                                 




transaction costs in rebalancing the portfolios of institutional investors. We would expect even less 
so an immediate change in CSP given changes in the profile of the institutional owners of a firm. 
This is due to the sizeable upfront costs and time constraints that are frequently associated with 
changing the social and environmental output of a given firm. 
Nevertheless, it needs to be recognised that every feedback process like the one we have found 
is dynamic and as such there may be a part of the interaction between the two variables that occurs 
in a contemporaneous fashion. A further concern arises from the potential omitted variable bias. 
Specifically, there may be some firm characteristics beyond what we have controlled in our baseline 
regressions that are correlated with both the dependent variable and independent variables of 
interest. To address the potential endogeneity issue and reinforce the result of existence of the 
virtuous circle of long-term institutional ownership and responsible firm conduct, we perform 
several robustness tests in the context of instrumental variable (IV) estimations. 
We first look at the causality that goes from CSP to institutional ownership (our Hypothesis 1). 
Following Benlemlih and Bitar (2016), we use as instruments the initial level of the firm’s overall 
CSP score (𝐴𝐺𝐺_𝐶𝑆𝑃_𝐼𝑁𝐼) and the industry-year average of overall CSP scores (𝐴𝐺𝐺_𝐶𝑆𝑃_𝐼𝑌). 
These two instruments are likely to be correlated with the firm’s contemporaneous CSR score (the 
relevancy condition) and are unlikely to be endogenous to the firm’s contemporaneous 
institutional ownership (the exclusion restriction). Our IV approach consists of two steps. 
𝐴𝐺𝐺_𝐶𝑆𝑃_𝐼𝑁𝐼 and 𝐴𝐺𝐺_𝐶𝑆𝑃_𝐼𝑌 are used as instruments in the first stage regression: 
𝐴𝐺𝐺_𝐶𝑆𝑃𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1AGG_CSP_INI𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2AGG_CSP_IY𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛄𝐗𝒊,𝒕 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                            (6)      
where we include in 𝐗 the same control variables as in Equation (3). In the second stage regression, 
we re-estimate Equation (3) by replacing AGG_CSP with 𝐴𝐺𝐺_𝐶𝑆𝑃̂ , the predicted value of overall 
CSP from Equation (6). 
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The 2SLS regression results are contained in Table 9. We find in the first stage regression 
estimates that the two IVs are highly significant with expected signs (column 1). The results of the 
second stage regressions are presented in columns 2 through 4. The insignificant (column 2), 
negatively significant (column 3) and positively significant (column 4) coefficients of 𝐴𝐺𝐺_𝐶𝑆𝑃 
clearly show that investment horizon matters, and short-term investors tend to avoid firms with 
higher CSP, whereas long-term investors tend to do the opposite, reinforcing our earlier baseline 
regression findings regarding Hypothesis 1. 
 ------------------------------------------------------------------ 
INSERT TABLE 9 ABOUT HERE 
------------------------------------------------------------------- 
To check the robustness of our Hypothesis 3 results and ensure the path of causality that runs 
from long-term institutional ownership to CSP, we exploit the nature of the Russell index 
composition and annual reconstitution, following Fich et al. (2015), and Crane et al. (2016). The 
Russell 1000 and 2000 indexes are reconstituted in June every year. Based on the market 
capitalization of US firm common stocks as of May 31, the largest 1,000 firms are included in the 
Russell 1000 index and the subsequent 2,000 firms are included in the Russell 2000 index.19 Both 
indexes are value-weighted and no other criteria besides the market capitalization are used in the 
index reconstitution. Therefore, when a stock drops from the Russell 1000 to the Russell 2000 
index or gets newly added in the Russell 2000 index, the index-tracking (long-term) institutional 
ownership of the stock will increase exogenously. On the other hand, there is a negative and 
exogenous shock on a firm's index-tracking (long-term) institutional ownership when a stock 
moves up from the Russell 2000 to the Russell 1000 index or gets excluded from the Russell 2000 
index. 
                                                 




Our IV approach consists of two steps. The switch of firms between the two Russell indexes 
and the inclusion/exclusion of firms in the Russell 2000 index are used as the IVs in our first stage 
regression: 
𝐿𝐼𝑂𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1R1TR2𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2R2TR1𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3R2TN𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4NTR2𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛄𝐘𝒊,𝒕 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                (7)  
where R1TR2𝑖,𝑡 (R2TR1𝑖,𝑡) is an indicator variable equal to 1 if firm 𝑖 switches from the Russell 
1000 (2000) index to the Russell 2000 (1000) index in year 𝑡 and 0 otherwise. R2TN𝑖,𝑡 (NTR2𝑖,𝑡) 
is a dummy equal to 1 if firm 𝑖  leaves (enters) the Russell 2000 index and 0 otherwise. The 
relevancy condition of our IVs is satisfied because the index reconstitution apparently affects the 
long-term institutional ownership in all firms. At the same time the exclusion restriction is also 
satisfied because the only index assignment rule is mechanically based on the rank of stock market 
capitalization, i.e. firm size. Put differently, switching between the two Russell indexes should not 
have any direct effect on a firm’s CSR activities. We include in 𝒀 the same control variables as in 
Equation (5). In the second stage regression, we re-estimate Equation (5) by replacing 𝐿𝐼𝑂 with 
𝐿𝐼?̂?, the predicted value of long-term institutional ownership from Equation (7). 
Table 10 reports the 2SLS regression results. Looking at the first stage regression estimates in 
column 1, all IVs are statistically significant, confirming that the relevancy condition is satisfied. 
The results of the second stage regressions are presented in columns 2 through 7. It is clear that 
the results are consistent with those contained in Table 7, supporting our baseline analysis 
conclusion regarding Hypothesis 3 that long-term investors improve overall CSP of their owned 
firms (columns 2 and 4).20 
                                                 
20 Before 2003, only around 1100 firms were covered by KLD and therefore the overlap between KLD-
covered firms and the Russell 2000 firms was limited. To address this concern, we re-estimate Table 10 






INSERT TABLE 10 ABOUT HERE 
------------------------------------------------------------------- 
It is worth mentioning that MSCI ESG Research, the successor of KLD, introduced significant 
ratings methodology changes in 2010, following the takeover of RiskMetrics by MSCI. To 
investigate the potential impact of these methodology changes on our main results, we conduct 
further robustness tests. Specifically, we re-estimate Tables 9 and 10 using a sub-sample period of 
2003-2009. The results of these robustness tests remain qualitatively the same (see Appendix 3 
Tables A3.4 and A3.5).  
5. Conclusions 
Our study investigates the impact that investment horizon has on institutional investors’ 
preference for corporate social performance. Unlike previous literature, we use a direct measure 
of institutional investors’ trading frequency and, consequently, the average duration of their 
holdings, in order to distinguish between long-term and short-term investors. In addition, we 
explore to what extent the well-established asymmetry in stakeholder perception (and financial 
impact) between positive and negative CSP outcomes also influences institutional demand for the 
associated firms. Finally, we expand our exploration in order to identify whether there is also a link 
running in the opposite direction, i.e. if long-term/short-term investors also attempt (and manage) 
to influence corporate culture and change the levels of corporate social performance of the firms 
in their portfolios. 
Our results are revealing and intuitive as they are highly aligned with the predictions that 
stakeholder theory makes regarding the value-relevant impacts of stronger CSP –which should 
manifest in the long-run (Jones, 1995). Indeed, we show that although institutional ownership as 
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a whole appears to be unrelated to the CSP of invested firms, long-term investors prefer higher 
CSP and short-term investors tend to avoid it. These results are also in line with the conclusions 
of  Bushee (1998) who finds that the levels by which firms are held by long-term investors are 
inversely associated with “managerial myopia”. Such companies tend to be less pressed to provide 
immediate results to their investors and hence appreciate resources that are more likely to generate 
rather delayed returns (such as R&D investments or improved CSP).  
Additional exploratory analysis reveals that long-term investors’ preference for higher CSP is 
mainly driven by a significant avoidance of firms associated with more controversies whereas the 
negative link between short-term owners and CSP is primarily a result of their dislike for 
corporations with more social/environmental strengths. Lastly, long term investors seem to 
promote an overall betterment of the social performance of the firms they own but this 
improvement takes time – as results are stronger when we look at 5-year horizons. Hence, the 
picture that emerges is one of a “virtuous circle” between long-term institutional ownership and 
CSP, where one pushes the other to higher levels.  
The results are of tremendous importance to firm managers. Executives which are proponents 
of the ethical and financial incentives for better CSP (especially via the avoidance of any 
controversial practices) can rest assured that their initiatives will be appreciated by long-term 
investors who will also, in turn, push for further improvements in this direction. Individual 
responsible investors can also be reassured that their interest in good social corporate performers 
is shared by institutional investors who will, ceteris paribus, hold these firms for longer periods of 
time and thus help in retaining their prices to certain levels and reducing their downside risk. Lastly, 
policy makers who wish to promote corporate and market sustainability will now be more 
definitively informed that it is long-term investing institutions who mostly appreciate such 
characteristics and thus, it is them who should be appropriately incentivised. 
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Though we make some novel contributions in the literature, more work needs to be done in 
this direction. KLD STATS is the most widely used database in this field, yet it is not without its 
limitations and drawbacks. Alternative sources of CSP data are required in order to offer 
convergent validity to our conclusions. Our analysis is also entirely limited to the US market. Given 
the increased popularity and importance of SRI in Europe as well as in other areas around the 
globe, our methodology could be replicated to see if our main conclusions hold or whether there 
is a geographic element to them. Lastly, it would be really interesting for future research to explore 
whether the relationships we uncover also hold outside of the equity market (particularly for bonds 




Appendix 1 Definitions and data sources of CSR and institutional ownership measures 
Variable Definition Source 
AGG_CSP 
Overall CSP score, calculated as the sum of yearly adjusted individual 
CSP scores of the five main qualitative issue areas: community, 
diversity, employee relationship, environment, and product. For each 
dimension, adjusted CSP is computed by taking the net difference 




Overall Strength index, calculated as the sum of yearly adjusted 
individual Strength scores of the five main qualitative issue areas: 





Overall Concern index, calculated as the sum of yearly adjusted 
individual Concern scores of the five main qualitative issue areas: 





Community score, calculated by taking the net difference between 




Diversity score, calculated by taking the net difference between 




Employee score, calculated by taking the net difference between 




Environment score, calculated by taking the net difference between 




Product score, calculated by taking the net difference between 




Total institutional ownership, calculated as yearend shareholdings of 




Long-term institutional ownership, calculated as yearend 
shareholdings of long-term institutional investors relative to total 
shares outstanding. At each year end, institutional investors are 




Short-term institutional ownership, calculated as yearend 
shareholdings of long-term institutional investors relative to total 
shares outstanding. At each year end, institutional investors are 




Non-long-term institutional ownership, calculated as the difference 






Appendix 2 Definitions and data sources of control variables 
Variable Definition Source 
MV Market capitalization, calculated as the log of the product of the 
stock price and number of shares outstanding at year end. 
CRSP 
Database 
AGE Firm age, calculated as the log of the number of quarters since first 
return appears in CRSP. 
CRSP 
Database 
DY Dividend yield, calculated as quarterly total dividends per share 




S&PIDX Dummy variable that equals one if a firm is listed in the S&P 500 
index and zero otherwise. 
CRSP 
Database 
DTA Leverage, calculated as total debt divided by total asset. Compustat 
BETA Systematic risk (𝛽1,𝑖), estimated from the following regression: 
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1,𝑖(𝑅𝑚 − 𝑅𝑓) + 𝛽2,𝑖𝑆𝑀𝐵 + 𝛽3,𝑖(𝐻𝑀𝐿)
+ 𝜖𝑖,𝑡 
Using the previous 5-year monthly returns. 
CRSP 
Database 
IRISK Idiosyncratic risk, calculated as √𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝜖𝑖,𝑡) ∗ 3, where 𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝜖𝑖,𝑡) is 
the variance of the error term derived from the above equation 
using previous 5-year monthly returns. 
CRSP 
Database 
PRC Share price  CRSP 
Database 
TOV Turnover of stock holdings, calculated as quarterly trading volume 
divided by total shares outstanding. 
CRSP 
Database 
RET Cumulative gross stock return over the past three months. CRSP 
Database 
EPS Earnings per share. Compustat 
BM Book-to-market ratio, calculated as book value of equity divided 
by market value of equity. 
Compustat 
ROA Return on assets, calculated as net income divided by total assets. Compustat 
CASH The ratio of cash and short term investments to total asset. Compustat 





Appendix 3 Additional robustness tests 
Table A3.1 Institutional investors’ influence on future overall CSP (change regression) 
Table A3.1 displays the regression results of the change of CSP measures on the change of long-term institutional ownership and 
other control variables. Dependent variables ΔAGG_CSP, ΔAGG_C and ΔAGG_S denote the change of standardized overall 
CSP score, CSP concerns score and CSP strengths score respectively. Dependent variables are measured at t+1 year. All 
independent variables are in the current year t. The variable of interest, the change of long-term institutional ownership (ΔLIO), 
is defined based on churn ratio as in Yan and Zhang (2009) and calculated as LIO𝑡 − LIO𝑡−1.  Control variables include ownership 
of institutional investors that are not long-term (NLIO), firm size (LOGMV), Book to market ratio (BM), Return on assets (ROA), 
and leverage ratio (DTA), Cash holding (CASH). Detailed variable definitions can be found in appendix 1 and 2. Time fixed 
effects (Year) and industry fixed effects (2 Digit SIC code) are included in all regressions. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively. Standard errors are clustered at firm level and robust t-statistics are reported in brackets.  
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES ΔAGG_CSP(t+1) ΔAGG_C(t+1) ΔAGG_S(t+1) 
ΔLIO 0.022** -0.024*** -0.011 
 [2.45] [-3.72] [-1.26] 
NLIO 0.006* 0.002 0.005 
 [1.78] [0.88] [1.46] 
LOGMV 0.007*** 0.000 0.007*** 
 [14.52] [0.32] [13.62] 
BM 0.001 0.000 0.001 
 [1.03] [0.42] [0.86] 
ROA -0.008** -0.000 -0.004 
 [-2.01] [-0.11] [-0.99] 
DTA -0.004 0.000 -0.004 
 [-1.28] [0.15] [-1.05] 
CASH -0.012*** -0.001 -0.011*** 
 [-3.22] [-0.19] [-2.81] 
CONSTANT -0.297*** 0.080*** -0.204*** 
 [-24.35] [7.92] [-16.22] 
    
Observations 16,573 16,573 16,573 
R-squared 0.344 0.286 0.101 
Time FE YES YES YES 




Table A3.2 Institutional investors’ influence on future overall CSP (High CSP firms versus Low CSP firms) 
Table A3.2 displays the regression results of CSP measures on measures of institutional ownership and other control variables. Dependent variables AGG_CSP, AGG_C and AGG_S denote 
standardized overall CSP score, CSP concerns score and CSP strengths score respectively. Dependent variables in column 1, 2,5,6,9 and 10 are measured at t+1 year while dependent variables in column 
3, 4, 7, 8, 11 and 12 are measured at t+5 years. Column 1,3,5,7,9, and 11 are results based on firms with CSP higher than industry average. Column 2, 4, 6, 8 ,10 and 12 represent results for firms with 
CSP lower than industry average.  All independent variables are in the current year t. The variable of interest, Long term institutional ownership (LIO), is defined based on churn ratio as in Yan and 
Zhang (2009).  Control variables include ownership of institutional investors that are not long term (NLIO), firm size (LOGMV), Book to market ratio (BM), Return on assets (ROA), and leverage 
ratio (DTA), Cash holding (CASH). Detailed variable definitions can be found in appendix 1 and 2. Time fixed effects (Year) and industry fixed effects (2 Digit SIC code) are included in all regressions. 
*, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively. Standard errors are clustered at firm level and robust t-statistics are reported in brackets.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
VARIABLES AGG_CSP(t+1) AGG_CSP(t+1) AGG_CSP(t+5) AGG_CSP(t+5) AGG_C(t+1) AGG_C(t+1) AGG_C(t+5) AGG_C(t+5) AGG_S(t+1) AGG_S(t+1) AGG_S(t+5) AGG_S(t+5) 
LIO 0.009 0.009 0.012 0.034* -0.026*** -0.018** -0.021** 0.011 -0.020* -0.010 0.018 0.027* 
 [0.92] [1.09] [0.61] [1.70] [-4.09] [-2.43] [-2.10] [0.79] [-1.87] [-1.37] [1.00] [1.76] 
NLIO -0.039*** 0.012*** -0.056*** -0.013 -0.017*** -0.009** -0.002 0.007 -0.042*** -0.013*** -0.039*** -0.009 
 [-7.51] [2.75] [-5.94] [-1.33] [-4.70] [-2.25] [-0.39] [1.04] [-7.17] [-3.16] [-4.35] [-1.03] 
LOGMV 0.017*** 0.001 0.028*** 0.018*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.015*** 0.016*** 0.031*** 0.019*** 0.044*** 0.036*** 
 [19.90] [1.41] [17.46] [10.83] [24.66] [19.68] [15.69] [14.01] [30.69] [23.65] [27.87] [23.26] 
BM -0.000 -0.001 0.005 0.013* 0.006*** 0.004 0.018*** 0.009* 0.007** 0.004 0.017** 0.023*** 
 [-0.21] [-0.65] [0.78] [1.82] [3.31] [1.45] [5.00] [1.87] [2.17] [1.54] [2.35] [4.77] 
ROA 0.003 0.008*** 0.039*** -0.021 -0.018*** -0.012** -0.017** -0.007 -0.018*** -0.006 -0.023 -0.011 
 [0.49] [2.81] [2.58] [-1.15] [-3.57] [-2.25] [-2.11] [-0.87] [-2.62] [-1.35] [-1.59] [-1.22] 
DTA -0.003 -0.014*** -0.028*** -0.015 0.001 0.010** -0.000 0.012* -0.008 0.003 -0.040*** -0.007 
 [-0.54] [-3.43] [-2.66] [-1.50] [0.18] [2.55] [-0.03] [1.74] [-1.40] [0.82] [-4.23] [-0.86] 
CASH -0.004 0.000 -0.016 0.011 -0.004 0.000 -0.013* -0.004 -0.003 -0.001 -0.028*** 0.005 
 [-0.58] [0.00] [-1.32] [1.05] [-0.88] [0.08] [-1.93] [-0.58] [-0.42] [-0.25] [-2.63] [0.57] 
CONSTANT -0.318*** -0.075*** -0.547*** -0.430*** -0.194*** -0.215*** -0.250*** -0.244*** -0.587*** -0.356*** -0.857*** -0.735*** 
 [-17.58] [-3.84] [-16.14] [-10.39] [-15.25] [-11.11] [-11.89] [-7.89] [-26.82] [-17.68] [-24.54] [-19.98] 
             
Observations 9,832 9,990 5,176 4,733 9,605 9,812 5,171 4,682 9,605 9,812 5,171 4,682 
R-squared 0.341 0.309 0.304 0.260 0.226 0.327 0.263 0.312 0.359 0.183 0.362 0.307 
Time FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 










Table A3.3 Institutional investors’ influence on future CSP: 2SLS (03-12) 
Table A3.3 displays the 2SLS regression results of CSP measures on long-term institutional ownership and other control variables, using a sub-sample of 2003-2012. 
The dependent variable in the first stage regression (reported in column 1) is the variable of interest, long-term institutional ownership (LIO), defined based on 
churn ratio as in Yan and Zhang (2009). Instrumental variables used are dummy variables indicating the stock switching from the Russell 1000 index into the Russell 
2000 index (R1TR2), switching from the Russell 2000 index into the Russell 1000 index (R2TR1), dropping out of the Russell 2000 index due to a market value 
decrease (R2TN) and getting included in the Russell 2000 index due to a market value increase (NTR2). The fitted values of LIO from the first stage regression are 
then used in the second stage regressions displayed in columns 2 through 7. The dependent variables in the second stage regressions AGG_CSP, AGG_C and 
AGG_S denote standardized overall CSP score, CSP concerns score and CSP strengths score respectively. The dependent variables in columns 2, 4 and 6 are 
measured at the t+1 year while the dependent variables in columns 3, 5 and 7 are measured at the t+5 year. All independent variables are in the current year t. 
Control variables include ownership of institutional investors that are not long term (NLIO), firm size (LOGMV), book to market ratio (BM), return on assets 
(ROA), leverage ratio (DTA) and Cash Holding (CASH). Detailed variable definitions can be found in appendix 1 and 2. Time fixed effects (Year) and industry 
fixed effects (2 Digit SIC code) are included in all regressions. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively. Standard errors are 
clustered at firm level and robust t-statistics are reported in brackets.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES LIO AGG_CSP (t+1) AGG_CSP (t+5) AGG_C (t+1) AGG_C (t+5) AGG_S (t+1) AGG_S (t+5) 
R1TR2 0.053***       
 [6.87]       
R2TN -0.055***       
 [-8.08]       
R2TR1 0.026***       
 [3.09]       
NTR2 -0.042***       
 [-8.05]       
LIO  0.284*** 0.624*** -0.211*** -0.125 0.033 0.473** 
  [3.64] [2.75] [-4.0`2] [-1.15] [0.51] [2.37] 
NLIO  -0.036*** -0.079*** -0.005 0.004 -0.038*** -0.066*** 
  [-6.90] [-6.80] [-1.38] [0.66] [-8.01] [-6.47] 
LOGMV 0.013*** 0.015*** 0.027*** 0.016*** 0.018*** 0.033*** 0.046*** 
 [12.55] [10.82] [8.17] [17.67] [10.65] [25.98] [15.85] 
BM 0.008** -0.004*** -0.001 0.006** 0.020*** 0.004* 0.010 
 [2.33] [-2.73] [-0.17] [2.44] [4.94] [1.67] [1.43] 
ROA 0.015*** -0.005 -0.014 -0.009** -0.013 -0.019*** -0.037** 
 [3.36] [-1.05] [-0.75] [-2.00] [-1.43] [-4.00] [-2.41] 
DTA -0.014* -0.007 -0.015 0.005 0.004 -0.003 -0.022** 
 [-1.84] [-1.46] [-1.36] [1.42] [0.74] [-0.72] [-2.41] 
CASH -0.070*** 0.019** 0.034* -0.019*** -0.019* -0.003 0.009 
 [-8.83] [2.54] [1.79] [-3.58] [-1.92] [-0.42] [0.55] 
CONSTANT -0.124*** -0.341*** -0.636*** -0.184*** -0.286*** -0.633*** -0.925*** 
 [-6.14] [-17.17] [-14.74] [-13.43] [-11.57] [-32.12] [-24.01] 
        
OBSERVATIONS 18,051 14,853 5,853 14,506 5,969 14,506 5,969 
R-SQUARED 0.266 0.250 0.322 0.278 0.338 0.308 0.411 
TIME FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
IND FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
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Table A3.4 Institutional investors’ preference of aggregate CSP: 2SLS (03-09) 
Table A3.4 displays the 2SLS regression results of various measures of institutional ownership on overall 
CSP and other control variables, using a sub-sample of 2003-2009. The first column displays the regression 
of AGG_CSP on the instrumental variables AGG_CSP_INT (the initial value of CSP) and AGG_CSP_IY 
(the average CSP of firms in the same industry at the same year) and other control variables. The fitted 
values of AGG_CSP from the first stage regression are then used in the second stage regressions displayed 
in columns 2 through 4. The dependent variables TIO, SIO, and LIO denote ownership of all institutional 
investors, short-term institutional investors and long-term institutional investors respectively, measured at 
the year t+1. Long term and short-term investors are defined following Yan and Zhang (2009) based on 
churn ratio. All independent variables are measured in the current year t. The variable of interest is the 
overall CSP score (AGG_CSP) based on the KLD database. Control variables include firm size (LOGMV), 
natural log of firm age (LOGAGE), natural log of stock price (LOGPRC), Book to market ratio (BM), 
CAPM beta of stock (BETA), idiosyncratic volatility (IRISK), quarterly stock turnover (TOV), earnings per 
share (EPS), index membership dummy (S&PIDX), dividend yield (DY), leverage (DTA). Detailed variable 
definition can be found in appendix 1 and 2.  Time fixed effects (Year) and industry fixed effects (2 Digit 
SIC code) are included in all regressions. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level 
respectively. Standard errors are clustered at firm level and robust t-statistics are reported in brackets. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES AGG_CSP TIO (t+1) SIO (t+1) LIO (t+1) 
AGG_CSP_INT 0.496***    
 [17.43]    
AGG_CSP_IY 0.910***    
 [10.34] 0.054 -0.089*** 0.111*** 
AGG_CSP  [0.77] [-2.80] [3.51] 
  0.054 -0.089*** 0.111*** 
LOGMV -0.003* 0.033*** 0.005*** 0.006*** 
 [-1.96] [13.36] [4.91] [6.13] 
LOGAGE -0.000 -0.016*** -0.010*** 0.012*** 
 [-0.18] [-4.44] [-6.28] [7.89] 
LOGPRC -0.000 0.045*** 0.003 0.016*** 
 [-0.16] [9.74] [1.19] [7.56] 
BM -0.006*** 0.037*** 0.008*** 0.013*** 
 [-5.00] [4.39] [4.15] [3.19] 
BETA -0.004*** 0.010** 0.010*** -0.002 
 [-2.85] [2.57] [5.07] [-1.36] 
IRISK -0.001 -0.275*** -0.060*** -0.079*** 
 [-0.16] [-7.92] [-3.93] [-4.69] 
TOV -0.005 0.261*** 0.157*** -0.005 
 [-0.73] [7.42] [7.48] [-0.76] 
RET -0.007 0.110*** 0.094*** -0.007 
 [-1.50] [5.22] [9.27] [-0.86] 
EPS -0.001*** -0.007*** -0.000 -0.002*** 
 [-2.97] [-3.57] [-0.16] [-3.00] 
S&PIDX 0.004 -0.044*** -0.022*** 0.005 
 [0.81] [-7.07] [-7.68] [1.56] 
DY 0.206** -1.855*** -0.538*** -0.110 
 [1.97] [-3.50] [-3.04] [-0.68] 
DTA -0.013** 0.142*** 0.057*** 0.006 
 [-2.12] [10.33] [8.45] [1.07] 
CONSTANT 0.073** -0.599*** -0.079*** -0.112*** 
 [2.55] [-13.41] [-4.19] [-5.73] 
     
OBSERVATIONS 10,118 10,030 10,030 10,030 
R-SQUARED 0.295 0.345 0.283 0.156 
TIME FE YES YES YES YES 
IND FE YES YES YES YES 
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Table A3.5 Institutional investors’ influence on future CSP: 2SLS (03-09) 
Table A3.5 displays the 2SLS regression results of CSP measures on long-term institutional ownership and other control variables, using a sub-sample of 2003-2009. 
The dependent variable in the first stage regression (reported in column 1) is the variable of interest, long-term institutional ownership (LIO), defined based on 
churn ratio as in Yan and Zhang (2009). Instrumental variables used are dummy variables indicating the stock switching from the Russell 1000 index into the Russell 
2000 index (R1TR2), switching from the Russell 2000 index into the Russell 1000 index (R2TR1), dropping out of the Russell 2000 index due to a market value 
decrease (R2TN) and getting included in the Russell 2000 index due to a market value increase (NTR2). The fitted values of LIO from the first stage regression are 
then used in the second stage regressions displayed in columns 2 through 7. The dependent variables in the second stage regressions AGG_CSP, AGG_C and 
AGG_S denote standardized overall CSP score, CSP concerns score and CSP strengths score respectively. The dependent variables in columns 2, 4 and 6 are 
measured at the t+1 year while the dependent variables in columns 3, 5 and 7 are measured at the t+5 year. All independent variables are in the current year t. 
Control variables include ownership of institutional investors that are not long term (NLIO), firm size (LOGMV), book to market ratio (BM), return on assets 
(ROA), leverage ratio (DTA) and Cash Holding (CASH). Detailed variable definitions can be found in appendix 1 and 2. Time fixed effects (Year) and industry 
fixed effects (2 Digit SIC code) are included in all regressions. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively. Standard errors are 
clustered at firm level and robust t-statistics are reported in brackets.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES LIO AGG_CSP (t+1) AGG_CSP (t+5) AGG_C (t+1) AGG_C (t+5) AGG_S (t+1) AGG_S (t+5) 
R1TR2 0.051***       
 [6.15]       
R2TN -0.048***       
 [-6.30]       
R2TR1 0.020**       
 [2.14]       
NTR2 -0.043***       
 [-6.83]       
LIO  0.327*** 0.647** -0.252*** -0.195 -0.002 0.424* 
  [4.01] [2.48] [-3.77] [-1.58] [-0.03] [1.85] 
NLIO  -0.028*** -0.072*** 0.000 0.004 -0.026*** -0.059*** 
  [-6.13] [-6.85] [0.03] [0.65] [-6.43] [-6.47] 
LOGMV 0.013*** 0.002 0.027*** 0.018*** 0.019*** 0.022*** 0.047*** 
 [12.52] [1.23] [7.60] [17.09] [10.43] [18.83] [14.95] 
BM 0.008** -0.006*** -0.001 0.005** 0.020*** -0.001 0.011 
 [2.12] [-3.66] [-0.16] [2.04] [5.04] [-0.73] [1.51] 
ROA 0.011*** 0.001 -0.017 -0.007 -0.011 -0.006* -0.037** 
 [2.77] [0.31] [-0.85] [-1.43] [-1.22] [-1.68] [-2.38] 
DTA -0.002 -0.009** -0.015 0.004 0.004 -0.007* -0.023** 
 [-0.20] [-2.10] [-1.42] [0.98] [0.64] [-1.78] [-2.54] 
CASH -0.062*** 0.027*** 0.037* -0.026*** -0.024** -0.004 0.006 
 [-7.44] [3.66] [1.71] [-4.14] [-2.22] [-0.69] [0.34] 
CONSTANT -0.141*** -0.092*** -0.640*** -0.221*** -0.293*** -0.422*** -0.937*** 
 [-6.67] [-5.16] [-14.42] [-14.34] [-11.61] [-24.11] [-23.59] 
        
OBSERVATIONS 12,457 11,448 5,853 11,448 5,853 11,448 5,853 
R-SQUARED 0.187 0.090 0.322 0.220 0.338 0.216 0.411 
TIME FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
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Table 1 Investment horizon measures (churn rate based versus other classifications) 
Table 1 reports the proportion of each investor type under the fiduciary duty classification (Panel A) and 
under the Bushee classification (Panel B) that is categorised as long-term, short-term and other (i.e. 
medium term) investors based on churn-rate. The fiduciary duty classification and Bushee classifications 
are provided by Professor Brian Bushee.21 The churn-rate based classification (Long-term, Short-term, 
and Other) is created using the churn rate (see Appendix 1 for details). 
 (1) Long Term (2) Short Term (3) Other 
Panel A: Investors classified by fiduciary duties:   
Banks 51.58% 36.07% 12.36% 
Corporate Pension Funds 48.53% 25.23% 26.23% 
Independent Investment advisors 25.67% 44.66% 29.67% 
Insurance Companies 33.89% 48.52% 17.59% 
Investment Companies 26.54% 51.47% 21.99% 
Public Pension Funds 25.49% 43.15% 31.36% 
University Endowment 49.09% 36.63% 14.28% 
Miscellaneous  38.60% 21.92% 39.47% 
Panel B: Investors classified by Bushee (2001):  
Dedicated Investors 30.93% 45.77% 23.30% 
Quasi Indexer 43.34% 48.81% 7.86% 


































                                                 
21 The classification data is available at: http://acct.wharton.upenn.edu/faculty/bushee/IIclass.html 
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Table 2 Summary Statistics 
VARIABLE N MEAN STD  SKEW KURT Min 25% 50% 75% MAX 
Panel A: 
CSR 
          
AGG_CSP 22801 -0.023 0.105 1.520 7.318 -0.542 -0.083 -0.028 0.021 0.919 
AGG_S 22800 0.054 0.096 3.386 14.921 0.000 0.000 0.021 0.065 0.919 
AGG_C 22801 0.077 0.073 1.633 4.720 0.000 0.028 0.056 0.111 0.722 
COM_CSP 21924 0.015 0.174 0.651 15.512 -1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
DIV_CSP 22799 -0.072 0.290 0.064 0.784 -1.000 -0.333 0.000 0.125 1.000 
EMP_CSP 22794 -0.020 0.167 0.155 3.334 -1.000 -0.033 0.000 0.000 1.000 
ENV_CSP 22800 0.003 0.142 0.903 9.929 -0.833 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
PSQ_CSP 22184 -0.027 0.194 0.500 8.900 -1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Panel B: IO           
TIO 22795 0.646 0.221 -0.549 -0.348 0.000 0.501 0.675 0.819 1.000 
SIO 22795 0.165 0.101 0.923 1.370 0.000 0.090 0.150 0.225 0.852 
LIO 22795 0.201 0.102 1.214 3.982 0.000 0.130 0.187 0.257 0.943 
NLIO 22795 0.445 0.188 -0.154 -0.531 0.000 0.312 0.455 0.582 0.946 
Panel C: Control          
MV 22801 6395.07 20416.20 9.80 139.23 8.03 458.50 1400.21 4338.72 519815.79 
BM 22801 0.561 0.607 -27.689 1879.880 -43.685 0.302 0.488 0.740 3.342 
AGE 22801 22.168 15.908 0.733 -0.481 1.000 9.000 18.000 34.000 63.000 
BETA 19752 1.066 0.637 1.016 2.354 -1.230 0.623 0.987 1.409 5.151 
IRISK 19752 0.113 0.084 3.331 26.464 0.001 0.059 0.091 0.141 1.565 
TOV 22801 0.170 0.175 6.544 118.455 0.001 0.071 0.125 0.211 6.196 
PRC 22801 32.839 45.713 23.227 891.966 -5.059 14.863 26.430 41.783 2351.950 
RET 22801 0.034 0.120 0.371 6.301 -0.828 -0.021 0.034 0.088 0.965 
EPS 22644 0.380 1.309 24.027 1031.960 -19.130 0.083 0.328 0.605 71.160 
S&PIDX 22801 0.261 0.439 1.091 -0.811 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 
DY 22765 0.004 0.008 10.885 253.131 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.006 0.309 
DTA 22801 0.254 0.196 0.986 0.943 0.000 0.098 0.225 0.361 1.000 
ROA 22614 0.020 0.173 -22.028 1260.600 -12.331 0.008 0.032 0.070 2.170 
CASH 22801 0.127 0.166 2.333 5.982 0.000 0.022 0.061 0.161 0.989 
Panel D: 
LIOP TERCILE AGG_CSP AGG_S AGG_C 
1 -0.032 0.038 0.070 
2 -0.020 0.062 0.081 
3 -0.018 0.061 0.078 
DIFF 0.014*** 0.024*** 0.008*** 
T [8.7] [16.44] [7.21] 
    
SIOP TERCILE AGG_CSP AGG_S AGG_C 
1 -0.016 0.056 0.074 
2 -0.022 0.061 0.081 
3 -0.032 0.045 0.075 
DIFF -0.016*** -0.010*** 0.000 
T [-9.52] [-7.06] [0.14] 
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Table 3 Correlation Matrix 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) 
(1) AGG_CSR 1.000 
     
 
             
 
(2) AGG_S 0.651 1.000 
    
 
             
 
(3) AGG_C -0.405 0.191 1.000 
   
 
             
 
(4) TIO -0.031 0.047 0.065 1.000 
  
 
             
 
(5) SIO -0.102 -0.073 0.019 0.574 1.000 
 
 
             
 
(6) LIO 0.096 0.159 0.055 0.532 -0.059 1.000  
             
 
(7) NLIO -0.090 -0.029 0.050 0.888 0.700 0.084 1.000               
(8) LOGMV 0.138 0.358 0.243 0.216 0.054 0.151 0.174 1.000 
            
 
(9) BM -0.021 -0.024 -0.002 -0.022 -0.076 0.073 -0.071 -0.160 1.000 
           
 
(10) LOGAGE 0.094 0.193 0.115 0.039 -0.123 0.233 -0.089 0.369 -0.009 1.000 
          
 
(11) BETA -0.061 -0.004 0.055 0.171 0.225 -0.014 0.212 -0.013 -0.037 -0.102 1.000 
         
 
(12) IRISK -0.091 -0.110 -0.026 -0.034 0.119 -0.143 0.042 -0.283 0.028 -0.207 0.285 1.000 
        
 
(13) TOV -0.056 0.027 0.093 0.293 0.326 0.020 0.368 0.040 -0.035 -0.090 0.297 0.353 1.000 
       
 
(14) LOGPRC 0.104 0.154 0.060 0.198 0.049 0.149 0.133 0.632 -0.158 0.293 -0.227 -0.378 -0.070 1.000 
      
 
(15) RET 0.010 -0.009 -0.021 0.015 0.158 -0.072 0.054 0.029 -0.159 -0.012 0.055 -0.059 -0.050 0.099 1.000 
     
 
(16) EPS 0.021 0.048 0.040 0.008 -0.018 0.040 -0.021 0.187 0.037 0.111 -0.075 -0.158 -0.098 0.391 0.101 1.000 
    
 
(17) S&PIDX 0.108 0.280 0.189 0.053 -0.007 0.088 0.022 0.618 -0.070 0.355 0.036 -0.142 -0.040 0.337 -0.001 0.089 1.000 
   
 
(18) DY 0.056 0.057 0.008 -0.144 -0.146 0.017 -0.206 0.085 0.061 0.139 -0.180 -0.163 -0.112 0.073 -0.026 0.031 0.075 1.000 
  
 
(19) DTA -0.042 -0.003 0.048 0.056 0.080 -0.013 0.074 0.047 -0.078 -0.005 0.088 0.056 0.039 -0.092 -0.030 -0.083 0.022 0.174 1.000 
 
 
(20) ROA 0.034 0.054 0.030 0.111 0.034 0.092 0.083 0.202 0.007 0.123 -0.100 -0.239 -0.061 0.313 0.136 0.236 0.094 0.069 -0.092 1.000  
(21) CASH -0.020 -0.045 -0.030 0.041 0.136 -0.098 0.166 -0.145 -0.145 -0.215 0.191 0.215 0.228 -0.198 0.037 -0.065 -0.132 -0.186 -0.231 -0.217 1.00 
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Table 4 Institutional investors’ preference of aggregate CSP 
Table 4 displays the regression results of various measures of institutional ownership on 
aggregate CSP and other control variables. Dependent variables TIO, SIO, and LIO denote 
ownership of all institutional investors, short-term institutional investors and long-term 
institutional investors respectively, measured at year t+1. Long term and short-term investors are 
defined following Yan and Zhang (2009) based on churn ratio. All independent variables are in 
the current year t. Main variable of interest is the overall CSP score based on the KLD database. 
Control variables include firm size (LOGMV), natural log of firm age (LOGAGE), natural log 
of stock price (LOGPRC), Book to market ratio (BM), CAPM beta of stock (BETA), 
idiosyncratic volatility (IRISK), quarterly stock turnover (TOV), earnings per share (EPS), index 
membership dummy (S&PIDX), dividend yield (DY), leverage (DTA). Detailed variable 
definition can be found in appendix 1 and 2.  Time fixed effects (Year) and industry fixed effects 
(2 Digit SIC code) are included in all regressions. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% level respectively. Standard errors are clustered at firm level and robust t-statistics 
are reported in brackets.  
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES TIO(t+1) SIO(t+1) LIO(t+1) 
AGG_CSP -0.010 -0.020*** 0.012** 
 [-1.34] [-4.36] [2.40] 
TIO 0.882***   
 [152.19]   
SIO  0.590***  
  [55.24]  
LIO   0.710*** 
   [45.50] 
LOGMV 0.004*** 0.000 0.003*** 
 [5.31] [0.25] [5.53] 
LOGAGE -0.004*** -0.004*** 0.001 
 [-3.22] [-4.00] [1.33] 
LOGPRC 0.001 -0.002* 0.007*** 
 [0.39] [-1.80] [6.44] 
BM 0.005* 0.004*** 0.005*** 
 [1.79] [4.28] [6.34] 
BETA 0.001 0.006*** -0.001 
 [0.70] [4.95] [-0.79] 
IRISK -0.052*** -0.027*** -0.038*** 
 [-3.64] [-3.03] [-4.01] 
TOV -0.012 0.047*** -0.004 
 [-1.14] [6.74] [-1.00] 
RET 0.072*** 0.036*** 0.004 
 [7.02] [5.54] [0.80] 
EPS 0.001 0.000 -0.001 
 [0.86] [0.46] [-1.07] 
S&PIDX -0.005** 0.000 -0.002 
 [-2.30] [0.01] [-1.36] 
DY -0.105 -0.079 -0.066 
 [-0.76] [-0.90] [-0.81] 
DTA 0.004 0.023*** -0.005 
 [0.72] [6.07] [-1.42] 
CONSTANT -0.100*** 0.061*** -0.080*** 
 [-6.14] [5.56] [-7.73] 
    
OBSERVATIONS 19,504 19,504 19,504 
R-SQUARED 0.786 0.508 0.607 
TIME FE YES YES YES 
IND FE YES YES YES 
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Table 5 Institutional investors’ preference of CSP strengths and concerns 
Table 5 displays the regression results of various measures of institutional ownership on CSP 
Strengths, CSP Concerns and other control variables. Dependent variables TIO, SIO, and LIO 
denote ownership of all institutional investors, short-term institutional investors and long-term 
institutional investors respectively, measured at year t+1. Long term and short-term investors are 
defined following Yan and Zhang (2009) based on churn ratio.  All independent variables are in 
the current year t. AGG_S and AGG_C are the variables of interest and are measured as the 
standardized CSP Strengths score and Concerns score from the KLD database, respectively. 
Control variables include firm size (LOGMV), natural log of firm age (LOGAGE), natural log 
of stock price (LOGPRC), Book to market ratio (BM), CAPM beta of stock (BETA), 
idiosyncratic volatility (IRISK), quarterly stock turnover (TOV), earnings per share (EPS), index 
membership dummy (S&PIDX), dividend yield (DY), leverage (DTA). Detailed variable 
definitions can be found in appendix 1 and 2. Time fixed effects (Year) and industry fixed effects 
(2 Digit SIC code) are included in all regressions. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% level respectively. Standard errors are clustered at firm level and robust t-statistics 
are reported in brackets.  
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES TIO(t+1) SIO(t+1) LIO(t+1) 
AGG_S -0.017** -0.022*** 0.006 
 [-2.13] [-4.68] [1.33] 
AGG_C -0.027** 0.000 -0.033*** 
 [-2.45] [0.07] [-4.90] 
TIO 0.881***   
 [151.62]   
SIO  0.590***  
  [55.35]  
LIO   0.709*** 
   [45.52] 
LOGMV 0.005*** 0.000 0.003*** 
 [5.79] [0.78] [6.00] 
LOGAGE -0.004*** -0.004*** 0.001 
 [-3.12] [-3.89] [1.43] 
LOGPRC 0.000 -0.002** 0.006*** 
 [0.17] [-2.01] [6.21] 
BM 0.005* 0.004*** 0.005*** 
 [1.91] [4.34] [6.57] 
BETA 0.001 0.006*** -0.001 
 [0.78] [5.04] [-0.74] 
IRISK -0.052*** -0.026*** -0.038*** 
 [-3.61] [-2.96] [-4.00] 
TOV -0.011 0.047*** -0.004 
 [-1.11] [6.78] [-0.98] 
RET 0.072*** 0.037*** 0.004 
 [7.04] [5.57] [0.79] 
EPS 0.001 0.000 -0.001 
 [0.88] [0.51] [-1.02] 
S&PIDX -0.004* 0.001 -0.002 
 [-1.89] [0.34] [-1.07] 
DY -0.104 -0.080 -0.063 
 [-0.76] [-0.91] [-0.78] 
DTA 0.004 0.023*** -0.005 
 [0.76] [6.07] [-1.42] 
CONSTANT -0.110*** 0.054*** -0.084*** 
 [-6.56] [4.76] [-7.83] 
    
OBSERVATIONS 19,503 19,503 19,503 
R-SQUARED 0.786 0.508 0.607 
TIME FE YES YES YES 
IND FE YES YES YES 
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Table 6 Institutional investors’ preference of specific CSP dimensions 
Table 6 displays the regression results of various measures of institutional ownership on measures of specific CSP dimensions and other control variables. Dependent 
variables SIO and LIO denote ownership of short-term institutional investors and long-term institutional investors respectively, measured at year t+1. Long-term and 
short-term investors are defined based on churn ratio as in Yan and Zhang (2009).  All independent variables are in the current year t. Variables of interest are COM_CSP, 
DIV_CSP, EMP_CSP, ENV_CSP, PSQ_CSP, representing the standardized CSP scores of Community, Diversity, Employee, Environment and Product, from KLD 
database. Control variables include firm size (LOGMV), natural log of firm age (LOGAGE), natural log of stock price (LOGPRC), Book to market ratio (BM), CAPM 
beta of stock (BETA), idiosyncratic volatility (IRISK), quarterly stock turnover (TOV), earnings per share (EPS), index membership dummy (S&PIDX), dividend yield 
(DY), leverage (DTA). Detailed variable definitions can be found in appendix 1 and 2. Time fixed effects (Year) and industry fixed effects (2 Digit SIC code) are included 
in all regressions. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively. Standard errors are clustered at firm level and robust t-statistics are 
reported in brackets.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
VARIABLES SIO(t+1) SIO(t+1) SIO(t+1) SIO(t+1) SIO(t+1) LIO(t+1) LIO(t+1) LIO(t+1) LIO(t+1) LIO(t+1) 
COM_CSP -0.004     0.003     
 [-1.53]     [1.32]     
DIV_CSP  0.001     -0.002    
  [0.33]     [-1.32]    
EMP_CSP   -0.003     0.005**   
   [-1.00]     [2.04]   
ENV_CSP    -0.006*     0.001  
    [-1.93]     [0.28]  
PSQ_CSP     -0.008***     0.008*** 
     [-3.11]     [2.85] 
LOGMV -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 
 [-0.04] [-0.19] [-0.05] [0.01] [-0.14] [4.96] [5.88] [5.67] [5.76] [5.72] 
BM 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 
 [4.20] [4.31] [4.30] [4.29] [4.05] [6.26] [6.31] [6.38] [6.29] [5.91] 
LOGAGE -0.003*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** 0.002* 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002* 
 [-3.63] [-4.01] [-4.03] [-4.07] [-3.85] [1.72] [1.42] [1.39] [1.35] [1.77] 
BETA 0.005*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 [4.48] [5.06] [5.03] [5.05] [4.89] [-0.77] [-0.90] [-0.79] [-0.88] [-0.66] 
IRISK -0.028*** -0.026*** -0.026*** -0.027*** -0.027*** -0.037*** -0.038*** -0.038*** -0.038*** -0.037*** 
 [-3.14] [-2.99] [-2.99] [-3.01] [-3.07] [-3.88] [-4.04] [-4.04] [-4.03] [-3.88] 
TOV 0.049*** 0.047*** 0.047*** 0.047*** 0.047*** -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.005 
 [6.86] [6.75] [6.75] [6.76] [6.73] [-1.04] [-0.96] [-0.96] [-0.98] [-1.19] 
LOGPRC -0.002* -0.002* -0.002* -0.002* -0.002* 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 
 [-1.66] [-1.77] [-1.81] [-1.80] [-1.78] [6.41] [6.32] [6.44] [6.43] [6.26] 
RET 0.038*** 0.037*** 0.037*** 0.037*** 0.037*** 0.005 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.005 
 [5.77] [5.60] [5.59] [5.58] [5.59] [1.03] [0.71] [0.78] [0.76] [1.04] 
EPS 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 [0.58] [0.53] [0.52] [0.50] [0.69] [-1.06] [-1.10] [-1.08] [-1.08] [-0.99] 
S&PIDX -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003* 
 [-0.06] [-0.05] [-0.05] [0.02] [0.01] [-1.49] [-1.29] [-1.33] [-1.32] [-1.82] 
DY -0.124 -0.082 -0.081 -0.083 -0.113 -0.049 -0.063 -0.066 -0.064 -0.051 
 [-1.35] [-0.93] [-0.92] [-0.94] [-1.25] [-0.57] [-0.78] [-0.81] [-0.79] [-0.63] 
DTA 0.025*** 0.024*** 0.024*** 0.024*** 0.025*** -0.006* -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005* 
 [6.22] [6.12] [6.10] [6.12] [6.33] [-1.86] [-1.47] [-1.44] [-1.48] [-1.67] 
CONSTANT 0.062*** 0.065*** 0.063*** 0.063*** 0.064*** -0.077*** -0.085*** -0.080*** -0.081*** -0.083*** 
 [5.61] [5.62] [5.74] [5.74] [5.76] [-7.48] [-7.97] [-7.74] [-7.92] [-8.18] 
           
OBSERVATIONS 18,738 19,502 19,497 19,503 18,934 18,738 19,502 19,497 19,503 18,934 
R-SQUARED 0.508 0.508 0.508 0.508 0.507 0.612 0.607 0.607 0.607 0.607 
TIME FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
IND FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
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Table 7 Institutional investors’ influence on future overall CSP 
Table 7 displays the regression results of CSP measures on measures of institutional ownership and other control variables. 
Dependent variables AGG_CSP, AGG_C and AGG_S denote standardized overall CSP score, CSP concerns score and CSP 
strengths score respectively. Dependent variables in column 1, 3 and 5 are measured at t+1 year while dependent variables in 
column 2, 4 and 6 are measured at t+5 years. All independent variables are in the current year t. The variable of interest, Long 
term institutional ownership (LIO), is defined based on churn ratio as in Yan and Zhang (2009).  Control variables include 
ownership of institutional investors that are not long-term (NLIO), firm size (LOGMV), Book to market ratio (BM), Return on 
assets (ROA), and leverage ratio (DTA), Cash holding (CASH). Detailed variable definitions can be found in appendix 1 and 2. 
Time fixed effects (Year) and industry fixed effects (2 Digit SIC code) are included in all regressions. *, ** and *** denote 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively. Standard errors are clustered at firm level and robust t-statistics are reported 
in brackets.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES AGG_CSP(t+1) AGG_CSP(t+5) AGG_C(t+1) AGG_C(t+5) AGG_S(t+1) AGG_S(t+5) 
LIO 0.020** 0.031** -0.027*** -0.007 -0.008 0.027** 
 [2.57] [2.11] [-4.99] [-0.80] [-1.23] [2.25] 
NLIO -0.022*** -0.046*** -0.010*** 0.006 -0.029*** -0.028*** 
 [-5.26] [-6.40] [-3.32] [1.41] [-7.72] [-4.46] 
LOGMV 0.012*** 0.021*** 0.014*** 0.017*** 0.028*** 0.040*** 
 [17.01] [17.66] [28.87] [22.67] [38.49] [35.27] 
BM -0.002* 0.006 0.006** 0.016*** 0.005** 0.019*** 
 [-1.94] [1.33] [2.32] [5.42] [2.26] [4.25] 
ROA 0.009*** 0.028** -0.017*** -0.013** -0.012*** -0.011 
 [2.71] [2.33] [-3.81] [-2.40] [-2.88] [-1.38] 
DTA -0.014*** -0.023*** 0.008*** 0.007 -0.004 -0.026*** 
 [-3.57] [-3.09] [2.78] [1.47] [-0.98] [-4.03] 
CASH 0.003 0.001 -0.003 -0.009* -0.001 -0.010 
 [0.66] [0.16] [-0.78] [-1.84] [0.16] [-1.40] 
CONSTANT -0.229*** -0.424*** -0.192*** -0.296*** -0.538*** -0.778*** 
 [-14.91] [-16.73] [-17.57] [-18.42] [-34.47] [-32.16] 
       
Observations 19,842 9,919 19,436 9,863 19,436 9,863 
R-squared 0.208 0.246 0.246 0.274 0.251 0.319 
Time FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 



























Table 8 Institutional investors’ influence on specific future CSP dimensions 
Table 8 displays the regression results of different CSR dimensions on long term institutional ownership. Dependent variables are COM_CSP, DIV_CSP, EMP_CSP, ENV_CSP, PSQ_CSP, representing 
the standardized CSP scores of Community, Diversity, Employee, Environment and Product, from KLD database, measured at year t+1. Our interested variable Long-term institutional ownership is 
defined based on churn ratio as in Yan and Zhang (2009).  All independent variables are in the current year t.  Control variables include ownership of institutional investors that are not long-term (NLIO), 
firm size (LOGMV), natural log of firm age (LOGAGE), natural log of stock price (LOGPRC), Book to market ratio (BM), CAPM beta of stock (BETA), idiosyncratic volatility (IRISK), quarterly stock 
turnover (TOV), earnings per share (EPS), index membership dummy (S&PIDX), dividend yield (DY), leverage (DTA), cash holding (CASH). Detailed variable definitions can be found in appendix 1 
and 2. Time fixed effects (Year) and industry fixed effects (2 Digit SIC code) are included in all regressions. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively. Standard errors 
are clustered at firm level and robust t-statistics are reported in brackets.  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
VARIABLES COM_CSP(t+1) COM_CSP(t+5) DIV_CSP(t+1) DIV_CSP(t+5) EMP_CSP(t+1) EMP_CSP(t+5) ENV_CSP(t+1) ENV_CSP(t+5) PSQ_CSP(t+1) PSQ_CSP(t+5) 
LIO 0.024* -0.003 0.071*** 0.089** 0.027** -0.075*** 0.001 0.030* -0.004 0.078*** 
 [1.91] [-0.11] [3.20] [2.53] [2.01] [-3.55] [0.10] [1.66] [-0.27] [2.69] 
NLIO -0.015** -0.018 -0.028** -0.033* -0.039*** -0.042*** -0.003 -0.029*** 0.024*** -0.030** 
 [-2.13] [-1.40] [-2.49] [-1.81] [-5.60] [-3.87] [-0.59] [-3.15] [2.99] [-2.19] 
LOGMV 0.014*** 0.018*** 0.078*** 0.098*** 0.006*** 0.009*** 0.012*** 0.025*** -0.023*** -0.027*** 
 [11.20] [8.34] [52.78] [43.47] [5.64] [5.43] [11.33] [14.87] [-15.01] [-11.17] 
BM 0.007*** 0.010 0.012*** 0.035*** -0.008*** -0.013* -0.003* 0.004 -0.017*** -0.047*** 
 [2.91] [1.13] [2.90] [3.27] [-3.11] [-1.69] [-1.78] [0.70] [-3.04] [-5.16] 
ROA -0.008 -0.008 -0.050*** -0.020 0.065*** 0.073*** 0.016*** 0.021* 0.034*** 0.016 
 [-1.29] [-0.60] [-3.05] [-0.79] [5.71] [4.91] [2.62] [1.83] [3.08] [0.85] 
DTA 0.012* -0.009 0.019* -0.000 -0.016** -0.036*** -0.003 -0.023** -0.025*** -0.026* 
 [1.87] [-0.72] [1.71] [-0.02] [-2.30] [-3.24] [-0.61] [-2.30] [-2.85] [-1.68] 
CASH 0.023*** 0.006 -0.007 0.017 0.038*** 0.093*** 0.018*** 0.007 0.007 -0.046*** 
 [3.09] [0.40] [-0.55] [0.77] [4.49] [7.18] [3.03] [0.71] [0.73] [-2.74] 
CONSTANT -0.193*** -0.269*** -1.502*** -1.925*** -0.253*** -0.251*** -0.252*** -0.493*** 0.497*** 0.590*** 
 [-7.23] [-5.83] [-47.74] [-38.98] [-10.70] [-6.76] [-10.89] [-13.60] [15.02] [11.57] 
           
OBSERVATIONS 18,587 9,281 19,434 9,863 19,428 9,858 19,436 9,863 18,829 9,380 
R-SQUARED 0.119 0.139 0.291 0.337 0.118 0.140 0.149 0.190 0.155 0.194 
TIME FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
IND FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
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Table 9 Institutional investors’ preference of aggregate CSP: 2SLS 
Table 9 displays the 2SLS regression results of various measures of institutional ownership on overall CSP 
and other control variables. The first column displays the regression of AGG_CSP on the instrumental 
variables AGG_CSP_INT (the initial value of CSP) and AGG_CSP_IY (the average CSP of firms in the 
same industry at the same year) and other control variables. The fitted values of AGG_CSP from the first 
stage regression are then used in the second stage regressions displayed in columns 2 through 4. The 
dependent variables TIO, SIO, and LIO denote ownership of all institutional investors, short-term 
institutional investors and long-term institutional investors respectively, measured at the year t+1. Long 
term and short-term investors are defined following Yan and Zhang (2009) based on churn ratio. All 
independent variables are measured in the current year t. The variable of interest is the overall CSP score 
(AGG_CSP) based on the KLD database. Control variables include firm size (LOGMV), natural log of 
firm age (LOGAGE), natural log of stock price (LOGPRC), Book to market ratio (BM), CAPM beta of 
stock (BETA), idiosyncratic volatility (IRISK), quarterly stock turnover (TOV), earnings per share (EPS), 
index membership dummy (S&PIDX), dividend yield (DY), leverage (DTA). Detailed variable definitions 
can be found in appendix 1 and 2.  Time fixed effects (Year) and industry fixed effects (2 Digit SIC code) 
are included in all regressions. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively. 
Standard errors are clustered at firm level and robust t-statistics are reported in brackets. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES AGG_CSP TIO (t+1) SIO (t+1) LIO (t+1) 
AGG_CSP_INT 0.544***    
 [19.04]    
AGG_CSP_IY 0.887***    
 [16.82]    
AGG_CSP  -0.008 -0.027** 0.036*** 
  [-0.40] [-1.99] [2.87] 
TIO  0.882***   
  [151.15]   
SIO   0.591***  
   [55.44]  
LIO    0.709*** 
    [45.38] 
LOGMV 0.008*** 0.004*** 0.000 0.003*** 
 [5.11] [5.24] [0.33] [5.20] 
LOGAGE 0.002 -0.004*** -0.004*** 0.001 
 [0.79] [-3.07] [-3.96] [1.36] 
LOGPRC -0.002 0.000 -0.002* 0.007*** 
 [-0.94] [0.20] [-1.86] [6.05] 
BM -0.002 0.005* 0.004*** 0.005*** 
 [-1.52] [1.85] [4.26] [6.49] 
BETA -0.006*** 0.001 0.005*** -0.001 
 [-3.22] [0.66] [4.87] [-0.68] 
IRISK -0.017* -0.053*** -0.027*** -0.038*** 
 [-1.80] [-3.71] [-3.05] [-4.05] 
TOV 0.007 -0.011 0.047*** -0.004 
 [0.85] [-1.08] [6.77] [-0.99] 
RET -0.014*** 0.073*** 0.037*** 0.005 
 [-2.58] [7.19] [5.59] [1.00] 
EPS -0.001 0.001 0.000 -0.001 
 [-0.72] [0.86] [0.50] [-0.97] 
S&PIDX 0.009* -0.005** 0.000 -0.002 
 [1.94] [-2.33] [0.09] [-1.64] 
DY 0.209* -0.105 -0.079 -0.068 
 [1.73] [-0.76] [-0.90] [-0.84] 
DTA -0.009 0.004 0.023*** -0.005 
 [-1.43] [0.75] [6.04] [-1.40] 
CONSTANT -0.166*** -0.101*** 0.060*** -0.080*** 
 [-5.47] [-6.21] [5.44] [-7.56] 
     
OBSERVATIONS 19,704 19,526 19,526 19,526 
R-SQUARED 0.325 0.784 0.508 0.606 
TIME FE YES YES YES YES 










Table 10 Institutional investors’ influence on future CSP: 2SLS 
Table 10 displays the 2SLS regression results of CSP measures on long-term institutional ownership and other control variables. The dependent variable in the first 
stage regression (reported in column 1) is the variable of interest, long-term institutional ownership (LIO), defined based on churn ratio as in Yan and Zhang (2009). 
Instrumental variables used are dummy variables indicating the stock switching from the Russell 1000 index into the Russell 2000 index (R1TR2), switching from 
the Russell 2000 index into the Russell 1000 index (R2TR1), dropping out of the Russell 2000 index due to a market value decrease (R2TN) and getting included in 
the Russell 2000 index due to a market value increase (NTR2). The fitted values of LIO from the first stage regression are then used in the second stage regressions 
displayed in columns 2 through 7. The dependent variables in the second stage regressions AGG_CSP, AGG_C and AGG_S denote standardized overall CSP score, 
CSP concerns score and CSP strengths score respectively. The dependent variables in columns 2, 4 and 6 are measured at the t+1 year while the dependent variables 
in columns 3, 5 and 7 are measured at the t+5 year. All independent variables are in the current year t. institutional investors that are not long term (NLIO), firm 
size (LOGMV), book to market ratio (BM), return on assets (ROA), leverage ratio (DTA) and Cash Holding (CASH). Detailed variable definitions can be found in 
Appendix 1 and 2. Time fixed effects (Year) and industry fixed effects (2 Digit SIC code) are included in all regressions. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% level respectively. Standard errors are clustered at firm level and robust t-statistics are reported in brackets.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES LIO AGG_CSP (t+1) AGG_CSP (t+5) AGG_C (t+1) AGG_C (t+5) AGG_S (t+1) AGG_S (t+5) 
        
R1TR2 0.051***       
 [7.42]       
R2TN -0.056***       
 [-8.49]       
R2TR1 0.034***       
 [4.21]       
NTR2 -0.035***       
 [-7.43]       
LIO  0.230*** 0.277 -0.278*** -0.160 -0.077 0.144 
  [2.68] [1.29] [-5.19] [-1.46] [-1.05] [0.76] 
NLIO  -0.026*** -0.051*** -0.004 0.009* -0.028*** -0.031*** 
  [-5.91] [-6.32] [-1.44] [1.90] [-6.97] [-4.34] 
LOGMV 0.012*** 0.010*** 0.018*** 0.017*** 0.018*** 0.029*** 0.038*** 
 [13.15] [7.29] [6.24] [19.94] [11.82] [23.93] [14.92] 
BM 0.008** -0.004*** 0.005 0.008*** 0.017*** 0.005** 0.019*** 
 [2.54] [-2.87] [0.93] [3.12] [5.60] [2.42] [3.89] 
ROA 0.019*** 0.005 0.024* -0.011** -0.010* -0.010** -0.013 
 [4.35] [1.31] [1.87] [-2.57] [-1.76] [-2.36] [-1.47] 
DTA -0.012* -0.011*** -0.020** 0.005* 0.005 -0.004 -0.024*** 
 [-1.69] [-2.78] [-2.53] [1.67] [1.05] [-1.19] [-3.56] 
CASH -0.071*** 0.018** 0.019 -0.021*** -0.020** -0.006 -0.001 
 [-9.98] [2.37] [1.12] [-4.09] [-2.17] [-0.84] [-0.07] 
CONSTANT -0.069*** -0.211*** -0.407*** -0.213*** -0.307*** -0.544*** -0.771*** 
 [-3.60] [-12.36] [-13.54] [-17.75] [-16.72] [-31.91] [-27.56] 
        
OBSERVATIONS 23,269 19,842 9,919 19,436 9,863 19,436 9,863 
R-SQUARED 0.266 0.208 0.246 0.245 0.274 0.251 0.318 
TIME FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
IND FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
 
